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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to explain the variation between Bolivia and Ecuador in terms of social 
movement mobilization around hydrocarbon policy since the early 2000s.  In Bolivia, 
protest movements, which gained widespread national support, emerged demanding the 
renationalization of the industry.  In contrast, in Ecuador protests around hydrocarbon 
policies have remained regional.  This is a curious development since it conflicts with the 
findings of current studies on indigenous movements in these countries: in Bolivia, 
studies have found that indigenous movements are characterized by their regional 
mobilization, unable to unite around common interests, whereas in Ecuador, indigenous 
movements are known for their ability to unite under a national movement and political 
party.  This thesis argues that each country’s experience with the neoliberal economic 
model and the political strength of indigenous movements were significant factors that 
affected mobilization around hydrocarbon policy.  Furthermore, the study also seeks to 
explain the variation across country in the relative strength of indigenous groups that live 
in the hydrocarbon-rich regions.  It argues that the movements in Bolivia’s hydrocarbon-
rich region are limited relative to their Ecuadorian counterparts by the strength of elite-
led autonomy movements, geography, and a historic regional divide. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In recent decades, private-sector control over natural resources has been a 
controversial subject in Bolivia and Ecuador.  This thesis seeks to explain variation in the 
public-private nature of natural resource ownership and control, focusing on the 
hydrocarbon industry, which stands out for being highly politicized during the 1990s and 
2000s.  Following transitions in both countries away from a state-led development model 
and toward an export-oriented one during the 1980s and 1990s, many groups in society 
have mobilized against private participation in natural resources, particularly in the 
hydrocarbons sector.  These protests have shaped Bolivian and Ecuadorian politics in 
important ways, not only by successfully reversing privatization projects but also 
contributing to the resignation of two sitting presidents in Bolivia and continuous 
contention between social organizations, private hydrocarbons companies, and the state 
in both countries.  
Research on Bolivia and Ecuador is rich in analyses of the formation of social 
movements against private involvement in the oil and natural gas sectors, as well as the 
role of these movements in bringing about a return to greater state involvement during the 
past decade.  The present study will analyze variation across time and across country in 
the nature of these social movements and in their role in increasing public participation in 
the oil and natural gas sectors since 2000. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This research will inform our understanding of the politics surrounding resources, 
resource access, and economic development in Bolivia and Ecuador.  Because the 
public/private trajectories of these natural resources is so highly salient for politics in 
these countries, a systematic analysis of variation across country and across time is 
critical for understanding political dynamics.  The privatization of natural resources such 
as hydrocarbons, citizens’ access to state revenues from production, and state oversight of 
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the industry’s activities (especially concerning the environmental effects of production) 
are especially important given that they have caused numerous politically salient, 
sometimes violent, protests.  Furthermore, the balance of state versus private control of 
hydrocarbons has implications for economic growth and redistribution: Whereas capital 
investment and private sector participation in the natural gas and oil sectors are expected 
to aid economic growth, state involvement in these sectors will likely be necessary to 
improve social welfare in Bolivia and Ecuador.    
Lessons learned about natural resource politics and their implications for Bolivia 
and Ecuador’s economies can extend to other Andean countries, where protests also 
contribute to unrest between society, the state, and private foreign interests, as was the 
case for electricity in Arequipa, Peru (2002), and the Doe Run Smelter in La Oroya, Peru 
(2009).  Finally, in a global context of natural resource scarcity, a study on when and why 
the Bolivian and Ecuadorian governments may increase their role in the hydrocarbons 
sector holds importance for international investment interests, considering that political 
instability and government involvement in the sector are widely expected to deter 
investment. 
C. PROBLEMS AND FINDINGS 
The goal of this thesis is to explain the causal mechanisms of increasing 
government involvement in Bolivia and Ecuador’s hydrocarbons industries, in contexts in 
which private investment in the sector has remained significant.  It will further explain 
how the neoliberal economic model acted as a catalyst to indigenous mobilization, which 
in turn became strong enough to force the state to increase its involvement in the 
hydrocarbons sector.  The analysis highlights cross-country differences in mobilization 
around hydrocarbons policies, behavior that strays significantly from what the current 
literature suggests.  In Bolivia and Ecuador, indigenous movements have been highly 
mobilized and politically powerful over the past two decades.  In both cases, indigenous 
mobilization in zones of hydrocarbons extraction has been particularly noteworthy. 
Above all other issues, demands of these movements—both in gas and oil regions and 
more broadly—have centered on issues of land ownership and environmental quality, 
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both of which have been threatened most intensively by natural gas and oil companies.  
In spite of these dynamics, in both cases left-leaning governments have passed reforms 
that have increased national involvement in the hydrocarbons industry; reforms have only 
partially heeded indigenous demands for land ownership or environmental protection. 
This thesis identifies the dynamics by which the governments increased national 
involvement in hydrocarbons, in an effort to support ongoing production and increase 
revenue flows, thereby disregarding some indigenous movements’ demands.   
The countries provide important variation.  For instance, in Bolivia, the party in 
office grew out of the indigenous movement itself, whereas in Ecuador that was not the 
case.  Furthermore, in Bolivia, regional divisions and tendencies characterize indigenous 
movements, whereas in Ecuador we observe a strong national movement.  Given this 
variation, it is curious that in Bolivia, mobilization around hydrocarbon policies in 
particular gained significant national momentum and support, while groups located in the 
gas-rich regions remained largely at the margin of such protest.  Throughout the 1990s, 
experts considered the indigenous organization in the hydrocarbon-rich eastern region of 
Bolivia to be the most important indigenous confederation in the country.1  Despite early 
abilities to mobilize, these lowland groups have not protested as effectively or as 
aggressively as the organizations in the hydrocarbon-rich regions of Ecuador.  The first 
formal organizing of the Bolivian groups against hydrocarbons interests took place in 
2004 and included only silent protest.  Actions to physically stop the hydrocarbons 
industry have been mostly absent from these organization’s strategies.  In contrast, in 
Ecuador, known for strong national indigenous mobilizations, protests over hydrocarbons 
policies has remained largely regional; these groups have protested aggressively, 
successfully halting oil production.  
As a first task, this thesis seeks to explain state involvement in the hydrocarbons 
sector alongside continued participation of private companies.  Literature on the effects 
of the neoliberal economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s suggests that in both countries 
there has been a backlash against policies encouraging private involvement.  This has 
                                                 
1 José Antonio Lucero, Struggles of Voice: The Politics of Indigenous Representation in the Andes 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 91. 
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caused the population and the government to embrace increased state control of primary 
export industries.  While the state has increased its involvement, it has been adamant 
about maintaining private involvement through the successful renegotiation of contracts 
to increase the government’s take of revenues.  The thesis will explain this ongoing 
private involvement by showing that the state has proven to be ineffective and 
inexperienced, thus requiring private investment or expertise.  Furthermore, private 
participation in the natural gas and oil sectors persists because of the revenues that private 
international companies can bring to Bolivia and Ecuador, which the state can eventually 
use to appease popular demands for increased state involvement.   
As a second task, the thesis puts forth an explanation for the different paths by 
which popular mobilization triggered increased state involvement in hydrocarbons in the 
two countries.  Indigenous organizations and communities have been especially 
significant in mobilizing and protesting against private involvement.  In Bolivia, the gas 
wars in 2003 and 2005 were protest movements that gained nationwide support.  In 
contrast, in Ecuador protests remained regional.  Research on the contemporary history of 
indigenous movements in Bolivia points to the growing strength of indigenous 
movements overall, evidenced by the election of the first indigenous president, Evo 
Morales.  Recent literature on Ecuador’s indigenous movements, however, suggests that 
there has been a loss in the power and influence of the national indigenous organization 
and party in recent years.  This thesis argues that the current trajectories of these 
movements had a significant effect on the mobilization efforts around the hydrocarbons 
sector.   
Though indigenous mobilization has been significant in affecting hydrocarbon 
policy in both countries, there is important variation concerning the indigenous 
organizations in the hydrocarbon-rich regions of these countries.  In Bolivia, 
organizations from the oil and natural gas region were largely absent during the gas wars 
protests (though they did support the initiative).  In Ecuador, indigenous organizations 
and communities in the oil rich region of the country have been most effective when 
protesting separately from the national movement or using a set of demands separate 
from that of the national movement.  This thesis argues that the presence of strong, elite-
 5
led civic movements based in the eastern region of Bolivia has stifled the demands of the 
indigenous movements based there, influencing the relative success of these movements.  
In contrast, in Ecuador, there are no similar elite movements in the oil rich region.  The 
significant actors in this region—indigenous, colonists and oil workers—all protest 
against oil policies.  Although these groups are not formally united, they do share the 
same basic goal of increased state control of the sector.  The historical regional divide 
within Bolivia further affects the lack of strength of the indigenous movements in the oil 
and natural gas rich region specifically, the Guaraní.   
A description of the recent trajectory of the hydrocarbons sector in Bolivia and 
Ecuador follows.  This description will cover the events that took place within the sector, 
from the privatization efforts in the 1980s to the increased state involvement in the 2000s.  
The discussion will set the basis for the subsequent chapters covering indigenous 
mobilization that occurred during that period. 
D. THE RECENT TRAJECTORY OF THE HYDROCARBON SECTOR IN 
BOLIVIA AND ECUADOR: INCREASED STATE CONTROL 
State involvement in the hydrocarbons sectors in Bolivia and Ecuador has 
increased significantly from the initial implementation of the neoliberal economic model.  
In implementing this model, the state privatized many state owned enterprises (SOEs), 
international investment was highly encouraged, and social spending was severely 
limited.  The Bolivian state implemented this model with rigorous policies that aimed to 
cut the fiscal deficit by increasing prices (especially on oil and gas), raise revenues with 
tax overhauls, and balance the national budget by cutting government spending in health 
education and other services.2  The implementation of these policies had severe 
consequences for society, especially when a number of formerly state owned mines shut 
down, resulting in massive layoffs.3   
                                                 
2 Nancy Grey Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 126. 
3 Postero, Now We Are Citizens, 126. 
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In contrast to Bolivia, Ecuador’s implementation of these policies was less 
severe.4  This was due to the inability of then President León Febres Cordero to challenge 
state-market relations during the intended implementation of the model in the 1980s.5  
The state then had trouble fully implementing reforms in the 1990s due to the mobilizing 
efforts of Ecuador’s national indigenous organization.6  Since the reforms would greatly 
affect the rural and popular sectors, these groups mobilized in opposition to these 
policies.  Although these factors disrupted the complete implementation of the neoliberal 
economic model in Ecuador, the state was still able to enact policies that affected the 
livelihood of certain groups.  Policies targeting the oil sector and aimed at increasing 
exploration and production led the government to make a series of amendments to the 
hydrocarbon law in order to encourage private investment.  The resulting increase in oil 
exploration, drilling, and production have had negative consequences for the populations 
living in the oil region. 
The implementation of neoliberal economic stabilization policies in general 
negatively affected populations in Bolivia and Ecuador.  Weyland suggests that 
successful exploration activities during this period (a result of increased private 
involvement in the sector) led populations to reject stabilization measures as useless in 
the face of increasing hydrocarbon wealth.7  Populations also responded with demands 
for the state to regain control over the hydrocarbon industries in both countries.  The 
following sections will discuss the recent cycle of public/private involvement in the two 
countries.  This discussion will serve as the context on which the remainder of the thesis 
rests.  
                                                 
4 Lucero, Struggles of Voice, 127. 
5 President León Febres Cordero was himself a coastal industrialist and maintained close ties with the 
business class, Lucero, Struggles of Voice, 127. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Kurt Weyland, “The Rise of Latin America’s Two Lefts: Insights from Rentier State Theory,” 
Comparative Politics 41, no. 2 (2009): 146. Successful exploration was the result of increased private 
company involvement.  
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1. Bolivia: Popular Backlash Against an Extreme Neoliberal Project 
The following analysis of the Bolivian case will review how Bolivia took its 
hydrocarbon industry from one extreme to the other in a little over 12 years, from the 
partial privatization of the industry in 1994 to the partial nationalization in 2006.  The 
implementation of neoliberal economic policies privatized the hydrocarbons sector and 
encouraged foreign involvement.  During this period, the state was privatizing a number 
of sectors.  The natural gas industry experienced the intended results when increased 
exploration resulted in the discovery of large reserves.  Immediately following the 
discovery of large reserves, the population began to reject privatization and demand 
renationalization of the resource.  This sentiment helped fuel violent protests and elect a 
president who had been influential in these protests and who campaigned for 
renationalization.   
In 1985, the Bolivian government implemented a significant structural adjustment 
program called the New Economic Policy (NEP), which sought to privatize SOEs and 
heavily encourage foreign direct investment.  As mentioned above, the economic policies 
implemented as part of this model were very harsh, and the popular sector, including 
indigenous groups, suffered the most.  Together with efforts of the NEP, the state 
privatized the hydrocarbon industry through the 1994 Law of Capitalization as part of 
then President Sánchez de Lozada’s (1993–1997) Plan for All (“Plan de Todos”).  The 
Plan for All was met with little opposition due to support from two leftist parties in 
congress, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupak Katari de Liberación (MRTKL) and the 
Movimiento Boliviano Libre (MBL).8  The Law of Capitalization—also passed with very 
little opposition—approved the partial privatization of telephone companies, airlines, 




                                                 
8 Benjamin Kohl and Linda Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal Hegemony and Popular 
Resistance (New York: Zed Books, 2006), 86. 
9 Kohl and Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia, 86. 
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industry to private-sector firms through a competitive bidding process.  Of the remaining 
ownership interest, Bolivia’s pensions system received 49 percent, and the employees of 
the formerly public companies, one percent.10   
In 1996, before leaving office, Sanchez de Lozada passed the Hydrocarbons Law 
(Law 1689), also as part of his Plan for All.  The Law of Capitalization and the 
Hydrocarbons Law read that capitalization of hydrocarbons would split the industry into 
activities of production and transportation.11  The goal of splitting the industry was to 
spur the entry of more foreign firms.  The legislation also reduced wellhead royalties 
owed to the state from 50 percent to 18 percent in all “new” discovery sites.12  The 
government wrote this legislation with the intention of increasing investment and 
exploration. 
Privatization of SOEs in Bolivia was highly encouraged by the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the U.S. government, with the expectation that 
privatization would, “create firms that [were] more efficient, reducing corruption and 
leading to faster economic growth.”13  In line with these expectations, the state passed 
these laws with the intent of boosting Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Yet the sale of the 
state oil company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), to American, 
Dutch, Spanish and Argentine companies did not yield the expected results.14   
Following the privatization of the hydrocarbons sector, GDP increased but 
remained below government projections, due to a number of setbacks.15  Poor global 
economic conditions, especially Argentina’s economic crisis, severely affected the 
                                                 
10 Thomas Perreault, “Assessing the Limits of Neoliberal Environmental Governance in Bolivia,” in 
Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America? Societies and Politics at the Crossroads, eds. John Burdick, 
Philip Oxhorn, and Ken Roberts, 140 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Kohl and Farthing, Impasse 
in Bolivia, 97. 
11 According to legislation, production included exploration and exploitation activities. 
12 Susan Spronk and Jeffery R. Webber, “Struggles Against Accumulation by Dispossession in 
Bolivia,” Latin American Perspectives 34, no. 2 (2007): 34. 
13 Kohl and Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia, 105. 
14 Benjamin Dangl, The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia (Oakland, 
CA: AK Press, 2007), 121. 
15 Kohl and Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia, 113. 
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Bolivian economy.  Furthermore, the capitalization of the hydrocarbon industry, as well 
as other industries, led to massive layoffs similar to those experienced when state mines 
closed in the 1980s.16  The number of YPFB workers decreased significantly from 9,150 
in 1985 to only 600 in 2002.17  In the hydrocarbons sector, although capitalization was 
disadvantageous for the popular sector, increased foreign involvement resulted in the 
discovery of large amounts of natural gas in the late 1990s, sparking a renewed desire for 
resource benefits.  This newfound wealth, among other things, caused Bolivians to reject 
the neoliberal economic reforms and demand renationalization, a popular sentiment 
during the 2003 and 2005 national protests.18  The 2003 protests were particularly 
violent, and President Sanchez de Lozada resigned as a result. 
Vice President Carlos Mesa became interim president and immediately distanced 
himself from Sanchez de Lozada’s gas policy, promising changes on the issue regarding 
the control of natural gas.  In 2004, a referendum rejected the 1996 hydrocarbons law and 
proposed new strategies for gas exploitation.  Mesa argued that current contracts would 
be respected but renegotiated wherever possible and proposed that future concessions 
would pay at least 50 percent in royalties.19  Mesa’s proposals won in the referendum 
vote, but social organization pressures continued throughout the writing of the new 
legislation. 
Amidst ongoing protests against the privatization of gas, congress passed the 2005 
Hydrocarbons Law, increasing taxes from 16 to 32 percent and maintaining royalties at 
                                                 
16 When the state mining corporation, COMIBOL, closed in the 1980s, 22,000–23,000 out of 28,000–
30,000 workers were dismissed. Deborah J. Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of 
Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 
184.  
17 Kohl and Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia, 112. 
18 Weyland, “The Rise of Latin America’s Two Lefts,” 155. 
19 Postero, Now We Are Citizens, 213. 
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18 percent.20  The Hydrocarbons Law also mandated the reestablishment of YPFB, which 
would now be responsible for mediating all natural gas contracts and designated as the 
only importer and wholesale domestic distributer of gas products.  The new law 
mandated the renegotiation of existing contracts and gave a 180-day period within which 
the contracts had to be redrawn and approved.21  The new law was not sufficient to stop 
protests and ease the pressure on President Mesa, and in June 2005, congress accepted his 
resignation.  Bolivians elected indigenous union leader and activist, Evo Morales, 
president in 2006 on his campaign promise to nationalize the natural gas industry.  
Immediately following his election, President Morales (2006–present) 
nationalized the natural gas industry.  This nationalization promised Bolivia more than 50 
percent control of the industry, while foreign companies would continue to operate and 
manage facilities.22  The 2006 nationalization differed from the 2005 Law in that control 
of hydrocarbon reserves went to YPFB, and most importantly, the state would take 51 
percent ownership of the corporations operating in the hydrocarbons sector.  The 
nationalization, like the 2005 law, also required that existing contracts be renegotiated, 
but this time with a strict six-month timeline from May to October 2006.23  
In sum, in Bolivia, the government enacted harsh austerity measures that aimed to 
stabilize the economy but that also negatively affected the population.  Natural gas 
discoveries led the population to reject the new economic model including privatization 
                                                 
20 Allyson Lucinda Benton, “Political Institutions, Hydrocarbons Resources, and Economic Policy 
Divergence in Latin America” (paper presented at the Conference on Latin American Economies: History 
and Globalization, sponsored by the UCLA Latin American Institute, the UCLA Center for Economic 
History, and CIDE, April 24–25, 2009, and at the American Political Science Association’s Annual 
Meetings, Boston, Massachusetts, August 28–31, 2008), 28; Mark Weisbrot and Luis Sandoval, Update on 
the Ecuadorian Economy (Washington, D.C.: Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2009) 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/ecuador-update-2009–06.pdf (accessed June 4, 2010).  Taxes 
and royalties provide the resources governments need for development. 
21 Katherine Mcelroy, “The Mobilization of the Left and the Nationalization of the Hydrocarbon 
Sector: Bolivia’s Transition from a Pacted Democracy,” (Master’s thesis, The University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver, 2007), 27. 
22 Carlos Miranda, “Gas and Its Importance to the Bolivian Economy,” in Unresolved Tensions: 
Bolivia Past and Present, ed. John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead (Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 178. Under nationalization, foreign companies act as contractors for YPFB.  Their 
production is now marketed through the state company and the industry has to pay 50 percent of its income 
to the state, in taxes while YPFB participates in the profits from contracts.  
23 Mcelroy, “The Mobilization of the Left,” 28. 
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of SOEs.  Evo Morales rose amidst popular unrest was elected president, and he 
subsequently “nationalized” the natural gas industry.24  The government chose to 
increase its control significantly by renegotiating contracts with foreign companies.   
2. Ecuador: Austerity Plans and Popular Pushback 
Like Bolivia, Ecuador implemented reforms to attract increased private oil 
activity; reforms followed a decade later by legislation that increased the state’s control 
over the industry.  Throughout the 1980s, Ecuador dealt with fluctuating oil prices and 
the disillusionment that came from unsuccessful oil drilling and a growing foreign debt.  
As a result, Ecuadorian governments from 1981 forward undertook a number of austerity 
programs, which carried conditions such as cutting education and health services, 
reducing subsidies on consumer goods, and eliminating state jobs.25  Though neoliberal 
reforms were limited relative to those in Bolivia, they were still present.   
Ecuador responded to low oil prices and growing debt by increasing oil 
production, often times producing more than the allowable amount set by the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  As a result, in 1992 
Ecuador withdrew from OPEC on the decision of then President Duran Ballen.26  Duran 
Ballen took further steps to liberalize the sector in an attempt to improve Ecuador’s 
financial situation and increase its oil production.   
The state implemented reforms in response to a number of economic analysts who 
reported that Ecuador’s oil reserves were decreasing.27  Only proactive exploration and  
 
                                                 
24 Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl, “Material Limits to Symbolic Victories: Bolivia’s Social 
Movements and Natural Resources,” (paper presented at the 2009 Meeting of the Latin American Studies 
Association, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 10–14, 2009), 2. Although the Morales government declared that 
it had nationalized the industry, it is not nationalization in the classic sense, which includes the 
expropriation of assets. Some political and social actors continue to remain angry at the fact that Morales 
did not expropriate these companies and fulfill popular demands. 
25 Allen Gerlach, Indians, Oil, and, Politics: A Recent History of Ecuador (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly 
Resources Inc., 2003), 43. 
26 Suzana Sawyer, Crude Chronicles: Indigenous Politics, Multinational Oil, and Neoliberalism in 
Ecuador (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 95. 
27 Experts estimated that as of December 1992 only 3.2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves would be 
available for extraction and production. Sawyer, Crude Chronicles, 94.   
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heightened production activity would help Ecuador.  Since Ecuador required foreign 
investment and expertise, President Duran Ballen began pushing amendments to the 
hydrocarbons law through congress.28   
World Bank advisors worked closely with the state to amend the Hydrocarbons 
Law, aimed at decreasing state involvement in all activities.  Among other things, the law 
introduced a new type of exploration and exploitation contract called production-sharing 
contracts.  Until this time, the existing arrangements were risk-service contracts, 
according to which foreign companies rendered their services to Ecuador in return for a 
share of discovered oil.  Concretely, private companies would explore on their own dime; 
if they found oil, the state would reimburse the company, but if not, the companies ate all 
of the expenses.  Private companies had to account for all expenses so that when they 
made a discovery the Ecuadorian government would reimburse them.  In contrast, the 
new product-sharing contracts would eliminate this type of surveillance of multinational 
activities in the oil sector and decrease the risk borne by private companies, which no 
longer had to pay for failed exploration.29  The state awarded new contracts to companies 
that committed the most capital and that proposed the most detailed exploration plans.30  
With no reimbursement involved, the state no longer needed to monitor multinational 
activity, which was an incentive for companies to minimize their costs.31  The 
amendments to the hydrocarbons law triggered increased private involvement in and 
privatization of the hydrocarbons sector. 
Ecuadorian governments did not make any significant changes in the 
hydrocarbons sector from the implementation of the privatization policies through the 
late 1990s.  Ecuadorian presidents were barely able to stay in office, much less make any 
sweeping changes to legislation.  After President Abdalá Bucaram had served only six 
months, he was removed amid corruption scandals in 1997.  President Jamil Mahuad 
would be removed just a few years later, a case that illustrates just how powerful 
                                                 





mobilization against the neoliberal economic model could be in Ecuador.  Shortly after 
Mahuad took office, the state spent billions attempting to bail out a number of banks that 
were in crisis.32  Because of these expenditures, the state cut back significantly on social 
spending, while wages fell and unemployment rose.33  These activities led critics to label 
the Mahuad government as a “predatory state,” redirecting resources to benefit the 
elites.34  Approval of Mahuad decreased when he replaced the sucre with the U.S. dollar 
“in hopes of reassuring foreign investors and the IMF.”35  Already unhappy with the 
governments’ neoliberal economic policies, the population was disappointed with the 
path he was taking.  In January 2000, an indigenous-military coup ousted Mahuad. The 
event took place amid ongoing protests initiated and led by the national indigenous 
movement, the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE).36  
Following these events, presidents were under pressure to undertake neoliberal reforms in 
order to encourage confidence in investors.37  The oil sector however, remained 
unchanged, as presidents were unable to liberalize the sector further, due to congressional 
disapproval and indigenous opposition.38   
Literature on hydrocarbon policy in Latin America suggests that in 2004 and 
2005, Ecuador’s financial position improved and opened the way for the government of 
Alfredo Palacio to increase state control in the oil sector.39  Almost a year into his 
presidency following another early removal of an Ecuadorian president, in April 2006, 
Palacio called for changes to the hydrocarbon law.  In what some labeled as a turn toward 
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37 Benton, “Political Institutions, Hydrocarbons Resources, and Economic Policy Divergence,” 33. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 34. 
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more state involvement, he increased the state’s fiscal take to 60 percent.40  Following 
the amendment to the hydrocarbon law, the Ecuadorian government cancelled Occidental 
Oil Company’s contract, citing the illegal sale of 40 percent of its rights to a Canadian 
Company.41  These events happened amidst continued regional popular unrest in 
Ecuador’s northeast, particularly within the indigenous populations, some of whom were 
embroiled in a legal battle with Occidental. 
The election of Rafael Correa in 2006 brought about a further increase in the 
state’s fiscal take, increasing windfall profit taxes from 50 percent to 99 percent.42  The 
Economist defines windfall profit taxes as taxes on profits that are made unexpectedly.  
In the case of oil, windfall profits result from market price fluctuations and therefore, 
taxing these profits should not harm the company.43   
As of now, private companies are still involved in the sector with an increasing 
role for the state company, Petroecuador, especially after the addition of Occidental’s 
block 15 (following the cancellation of Occidental’s contract).44  According to one World 
Bank publication, Ecuador’s oil sector is experiencing a critical situation: “In particular, 
the government-owned company Petroecuador is undergoing a major crisis…operating 
with restricted budgets, [with] poorly maintained installations and numerous wells on 
which production has been halted, and causes significant environmental damage.”45  The  
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proposed solution, put forth by staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, will include attracting more investors for upstream and downstream 
activity.46 
To summarize, like in Bolivia, successive Ecuadorian presidents first privatized 
then gradually increased state involvement in the hydrocarbons sector.  However, the 
degree of change in the most recent shift toward state participation was not as extreme as 
it was in Bolivia due to the limited implementation of neoliberal reform policies in 
Ecuador.   
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Recent research has sought to explore the causal mechanisms behind privatization 
and increased state participation in the hydrocarbons sector in Latin America.  Much of 
the literature lacks analysis of these policies in terms of across-country comparisons of 
social movement mobilization around hydrocarbons policies.  The literature suggests that, 
unlike the Ecuadorian case, indigenous movements in Bolivia have historically been 
unable to unite under a national Bolivian organization.  However, during the 
mobilizations against private involvement, we see a national movement emerge in 
Bolivia with a strong indigenous support base.  At the same time, organizations in the 
hydrocarbon-rich region of Bolivia did not join in the national protests and were unable 
to organize their own regional efforts.  In contrast, indigenous organizations in Ecuador 
have historically been strong and able to organize under a national organization and 
party.  However, we see that in the mobilization against oil privatization, regional 
organizations are strongest, and there have been more successes—in terms of the state 
addressing demands—in the oil rich regions relative to those in Bolivia.  This thesis 
builds on scholarship that is more helpful for explaining variation: literature on neoliberal 
economic policies, studies indicating the necessary role of private investment in the 
hydrocarbons industries, research on the strengths and influence of regional and national 
indigenous organizations, and work on the conservative, elite-led autonomy movement in 
eastern Bolivia. 
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One major focus of research on natural resources in Bolivia and Ecuador focuses 
on international factors.  Specifically, scholars argue that international pressures 
encouraged privatization, which, in turn, led to a backlash.  According to this perspective, 
social movements rising up against privatization successfully reversed, or at least limited, 
privatization.  However, this literature fails to explain the variation we observe across 
time.  There have been a number of episodes of nationalization within each country over 
time, and in each case, the state either had to turn to private investment or expertise in 
order to salvage a weakening industry or due to pressures from international financial 
institutions as conditions for loans.   
For purposes of this thesis, the literature on the roles of international institutions 
and actors helps to explain the implementation of the neoliberal economic models and 
subsequent structural adjustment policies that acted as a catalyst in mobilizing previously 
marginalized sectors of society.  These policies illustrate the importance that international 
pressure can have on countries that are struggling economically, especially those that are 
dependent on hydrocarbons exports. 
International Financial Institutions (IFI) and multinational corporations’ 
involvement in the economy has been critical for the growth of these economies.  
Morales points out, “The conventional view is that if Bolivia wants to develop, it needs to 
take part fully in patterns of international trade and attract flows of foreign capital to 
finance the investment needed for future growth.”47  This is also true of Ecuador’s 
government, which welcomes the continuous presence of IFI and multinational 
investment. 
IFIs and multinational companies have historically been very important actors 
when looking at who controls Bolivia and Ecuador’s natural resources in particular.  As 
mentioned above, it was due to IFI pressure that radical economic policies were initiated 
in 1985 with the NEP in Bolivia and austerity measures in Ecuador in the 1980s and  
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1990s.  The pressure from IFIs has undoubtedly put heads of state in a position to make 
extreme policy changes concerning the economy while at the same time inflaming the 
population to protest these very changes.   
In spite of the economic benefits to neoliberal policies, due to their high social 
costs for much of the population, involvement by international players has caused a 
backlash among the population as can be seen in the protests against economic policies 
launched by the Bolivian and Ecuadorian governments.   
In Bolivia, the NEP implemented in the mid-1980s had the negative effect of 
inciting indigenous resistance toward neoliberal economic policies and had its worst 
effects on poor woman and children, forcing mothers to work and children to remain 
uncared for and forcing rural women to migrate to urban areas to find work.48  Kohl and 
Farthing argue that, “perpetuating the long history of indigenous exclusion, the NEP did 
nothing to incorporate Bolivia’s rural and indigenous population in sharing even the 
limited fruits of neoliberal market development…these groups emerged as an 
increasingly potent force in both the countryside and urban shantytowns.”49   
The move to liberalize the economy in Ecuador took a similar path, though these 
policies were not nearly as draconian as they were in Bolivia.50  The oil crisis in the 
1980s significantly decreased the price of oil, and on top of that, an earthquake in 1987 
damaged Ecuador’s only oil pipeline, halting exports for five months.51  These events 
exacerbated economic conditions as governments scrambled to secure foreign investment 
and undertake structural adjustment programs in order to stabilize the economy.  
Economic “belt-tightening” began in 1981, and every administration from then on 
pursued economic austerity programs.52  The outcomes were similar to those in Bolivia;  
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these policies served as a catalyst for social mobilization.  As Gerlach explains, “Social 
problems multiplied as services waned, prices rose, and the state’s financial ability to 
confront them diminished.”53  
While literature suggesting that international institutions have been influential in 
the Bolivian and Ecuadorian hydrocarbons sector (in the past three decades especially) is 
useful, it does not recognize the persistent reliance of the state on private investment and 
expertise to develop and operate the industry.  In many instances, the governments 
themselves determined that either investment or experience was needed to help manage, 
operate and develop industry activities.54  Scholarship on the history of the hydrocarbons 
industries in both Bolivia and Ecuador suggests an enduring relationship of 
interdependence between the state and private oil companies across time.  In both 
countries, this relationship began before the discovery of hydrocarbons and remained 
present to some degree in instances when the industry came under state “control.”   
To support my argument of continued private involvement in Bolivia and 
Ecuador’s hydrocarbons sectors, I will turn to research on the rentier state.  According to 
the literature, the rentier state “is one where the rents are paid by foreign actors, where 
they accrue directly to the state, and where only a few are engaged in the generation of 
this rent (wealth), the majority being only involved in the distribution or utilization of 
it.”55  In the case of Bolivia and Ecuador, I find that the state is able to use revenues from 
natural gas exportation for social spending, thereby buying off actors that demand more 
state control of the sector.56 
To explain the variation across country concerning indigenous movement 
mobilization and the nature of protest—i.e., national versus regional—I will utilize 
literature focused on the emergence and trajectory of social movements.  Social 
movements in Bolivia and Ecuador are perhaps particularly critical when considering the 
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condition of the hydrocarbons sector in each country; natural resource policies have 
triggered intense popular mobilization powerful enough at the national level to remove 
two sitting presidents in Bolivia and at the regional level to halt production in Ecuador.  
However, as is true of scholarship that points to international factors, research on social 
movements alone cannot explain the variation of private-public involvement in the sector 
across time or across country.  Since indigenous populations did not begin mobilizing 
around hydrocarbon issues until the 1980s and 1990s, these movements did not have an 
effect on the cycles of nationalization-privatization that occurred before the 1980s.   
Turning away from social movements, scholarship concerning indigenous-based 
political parties can help explain the cross-country variation in protests.  The analyses of 
the Bolivian and Ecuadorian cases will draw on literature on the rise and strengthening of 
Evo Morales and his political party, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia, and on 
the split and weakening of Ecuador’s national indigenous organization, CONAIE.57 
Scholarship examining the Bolivian gas wars suggests that these events became 
national protests due to the perception of gas as a national symbol.  In exploring literature 
to assist in my research, I turn to an argument put forth by Spronk and Webber, which 
suggests that protests against hydrocarbons enjoyed a national support base in Bolivia 
due to the fact that gas is important for the future of the country.  Spronk and Webber 
argue that gas is “structurally significant” in that it is “an important input in industrial 
capitalist economies, unevenly and scarcely distributed in the world, relatively easy to 
establish oligopolistic control over, and a central source of revenue for economic 
development and state building.”58  Negotiations between the state and social movements 
on the gas sector are really efforts to influence the future of the state.  The Spronk and 
Webber analysis will be useful for explaining the Bolivian case.  However, it does not 
provide an acceptable explanation for why oil protests in Ecuador are more concentrated.  
For the analysis on Ecuador, I will be using literature that focuses on particular regional 
protest events and Amazon indigenous communities. 
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To explain variation in regional involvement in natural resource protest across 
country, I look at the relative strength of these movements and analyze the influence of 
the right-wing regional autonomy movement in Bolivia’s eastern regions.  Sub-national 
political actors have increasingly played a strong role in policymaking.  As Kent Eaton 
points out, “Decentralization has given subnational government’s increased fiscal 
resources, greater administrative powers, and much higher levels of political 
independence, all of which can encourage subnational leaders to identify and advance 
territorial interests that may not conform to the interests of the center.”59  These elite led 
groups are strong enough to either stifle or neutralize indigenous organizations in the oil 
rich region of Bolivia.  No such conservative mobilization has existed in northeastern 
Ecuador. 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Primary and secondary sources were used for this study.  Across time, a majority 
of the thesis focuses on the period from 1985 to the present in Bolivia and from 1992 to 
the present in Ecuador but also analyzes the historical evolution of hydrocarbons in both 
countries.  Across country, analysis focuses first on the trajectories of protest regarding 
hydrocarbons policies and second on indigenous organizations in the hydrocarbons rich 
regions of each country. 
G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II will describe the history of private involvement in each country across 
time, demonstrating that a dependence on foreign investment and expertise was critical 
and explains why we observe ongoing cycles of nationalization and privatization.  The 
third chapter will analyze how actors mobilized at the national level in Bolivia over the 
last two decades to affect hydrocarbon policy.  The fourth chapter will be an analysis of 
social mobilization against oil policy to show how interests mobilized regionally in  
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Ecuador.  The final chapter will be my conclusion, followed by a short description of the 
implications of increasing state involvement in both countries and a discussion of the 
complex relationship between indigenous groups and private companies. 
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II. PRIVATIZATION AND NATIONALIZATION CYCLES: THE 
ENDURING INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE STATE AND 
PRIVATE HYDROCARBON COMPANIES IN BOLIVIA AND 
ECUADOR  
Increased state involvement in hydrocarbons in Bolivia and Ecuador since 2000 
has not been an isolated event.  Bolivia and Ecuador have experienced cycles of 
privatization and nationalization of their hydrocarbon industries since oil was discovered 
in Bolivia (in 1936) and in Ecuador (in 1967).  This chapter seeks to illustrate the 
relationship between the state government and private actors from the industries’ infancy 
to the implementation of neoliberal economic reforms and privatization. It emphasizes 
the interdependence between state and private actors; history shows that successive 
governments relied on private involvement even during nationalization projects.  
Through an historical analysis of hydrocarbons in the two countries, this chapter will 
show that even without the pressures of neoliberal economic policies, governments 
required private involvement in some capacity. 
Low state capacity in the hydrocarbons industry in each country has necessitated 
the continued involvement of private companies in the form of experience, expertise, and 
financing.  As a result of this involvement, relationships have developed over time 
between the companies, the government, and the general population.  These relationships 
have been strained at times, often creating an unwelcoming attitude by the public due to 
the belief that the companies were taking the country’s wealth and destroying the 
environment in the process.  Most often relations between the companies and the 
government have been difficult due to the government demanding more revenues and 
higher production, or the companies demanding more exploration contracts.  An across-
time analysis of the hydrocarbons sectors in Bolivia and Ecuador will inform the 
understanding of how the lack of state capacity has necessitated the involvement of 
private companies in both countries. 
As we saw in Chapter I, Bolivia and Ecuador took their hydrocarbon industries 
from a period of significant private control to a period of increasing state control.  
 24
Although state control has increased, both countries have maintained a degree of private 
involvement amidst environmental disasters and hydrocarbon company opportunism.  
This activity might be puzzling when only looking at the current trajectory of the 
hydrocarbon industry.  However, a look at the history of state and private involvement in 
these sectors reveals that the maintenance of private involvement amidst disasters and 
protests is necessary to sustain the profitability of these sectors.  The Bolivian and 
Ecuadorian states have maintained a relationship of interdependence with private 
companies throughout the history of the industry.  
A. BOLIVIA: LACK OF CAPITAL TO DEVELOP THE INDUSTRY 
The hydrocarbons sector in Bolivia has historically been a contentious subject.  
Indigenous tribes used it long before the Spanish arrived to cure wounds, keep fires 
going, and set flame to battle arrows.60  Oil, as well as other natural resources, was 
declared property of the Spanish King during the Spanish conquest.61  Details 
surrounding the discovery that would lead to commercialization of oil differ,62 but what 
is clear is that the initial bonanza spread throughout the country as local elites scrambled 
to stake their claim on the new riches.63   
Foreign involvement in the industry was necessary at the outset, since elites 
maintained claims in the mining industry as well as the emerging petroleum industry.  
Elites were often unable to supervise the surveying of new petroleum claims, and as a 
result, they turned to entering into partnerships with experienced foreign prospectors who  
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would do the work in return for a portion of the concession.64  Another reason foreign 
involvement became necessary was that many claimants lacked the capital to begin 
production and required foreign investment.   
We observe increased state control over hydrocarbons amid ongoing private 
involvement in the sector going as far back as exploration and initial exploitation. In 
1916, the Bolivian government temporarily halted petroleum licenses in order to issue 
new regulations and increase taxes.65  Despite the new regulations, claimants continued 
to sell the rights as concessions, opening up the emerging industry to foreign interests. In 
the early 1920s, U.S. companies began to move in and succeed in developing the 
industry.  These companies offered high prices for areas believed to be the most lucrative.  
People sold off a number of large concessions to either the New York-based Richmond 
Levering Company or the William Braden interests.  In 1921, New Jersey-based Standard 
Oil acquired the Richmond Levering Company and the William Braden interest in an 
agreement signed by the Bolivian government.66  By 1928, the company had made 
significant investments and produced 6,000 tons of crude oil annually.67 
In the early 1930s, increased exploration and development brought new problems 
and issues for the Bolivian government and Standard Oil.  The most significant result of 
these issues was the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay from 1932–1935.  A 
popular belief among Bolivians is that the Chaco War was the direct result of the 
competition between Standard Oil (operating in Bolivia) and Royal Dutch Shell 
(operating in Paraguay) to claim the probable oil and gas rich lands of the Chaco.68  
However, many historians agree that in fact the Bolivian government provoked the war in 
order to divert attention away from political and economic problems, namely a failing oil 
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industry.69  Philip argues that Bolivia initiated hostilities in order to secure access to the 
Paraguay River—for shipping oil—and the Chaco region—to build a pipeline.70   
Standard Oil and the Bolivian government were in a peculiar position due to the 
government’s desire for development and the company’s lack of confidence in the 
Bolivian oil industry.  At this point Standard Oil was losing interest in further investing 
in Bolivia’s natural resources, because it had experienced a number of obstacles blocking 
effective oil production and exportation.  For instance, in 1925, Standard Oil petitioned 
the Argentine government to build a pipeline from Bolivia to a deep-water port on the 
Paraná River in Argentina to facilitate its export.  Not only did the Argentine government 
reject the petition, it also raised tax rates on Bolivian oil, making any export 
unreasonable.  As a result, Standard Oil capped some of its Bolivian oil wells, adjusted 
production to meet domestic needs, and began to move equipment out of the country.71  
In a context of Standard Oil’s decreased production and growing criticism of the 
company among the population, the Bolivian government scrambled for ways to 
encourage Standard Oil to increase production.  The government’s solution was to initiate 
hostilities with Paraguay in order to gain access to a river port and land to improve 
development of the oil sector.72   
While it is not completely clear who was ultimately responsible for the initiation 
of hostilities between Paraguay and Bolivia, the period following the Chaco War became 
a turning point for Bolivia both economically and politically.  One response to the war 
was that for the first time, Bolivia’s government kicked out an international investor 
(Standard Oil) due to its illegal practices: “After the Chaco War, an enraged Bolivian 
public demanded that Standard Oil leave the country. The government eventually sent the 
company packing for clandestinely exporting Bolivian gas to Argentina, completing the 
first expropriation of property from a U.S. multinational corporation.”73  In 1936, shortly 
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after the expropriation of Standard Oil, Bolivia created the state-run company.  YPFB’s 
control over the sector gradually expanded and when the state officially expropriated 
Standard Oil in March of 1937, YPFB was already controlling a significant portion of the 
industry.74   
Another significant response to the Chaco War was the formation of groups 
opposing the ruling elites, who collaborated closely with foreign oil interests. As Kohl 
and Farthing write, there emerged a new “Bolivian identity coupled with a well-
articulated contempt for the rule of the landed and mining oligarchy.”75  At this point 
four key anti-elite movements emerged.  First, university students along with sons of the 
elites with contempt for the politics of their parents organized, later forming the core of 
the revolutionary movement, Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) that 
would later become the motivating force behind Bolivia’s 1952 Revolution.76  Second, 
two groups of junior military officers formed, military socialists, and the other, 
nationalist fascists.  Members of these groups would later form the leadership of the 
military government that ruled between 1964 and 1982.77  Third were the unions based in 
the mines, railroads, and urban print shops.  The growing left-wing political parties 
strongly influenced these groups, which organized Bolivia’s first general strike.78  The 
fourth type of groups to mobilize was Bolivia’s highland indigenous groups, the Quechua 
and the Aymara.79     
Shortly after the nationalization of oil in 1937, the crucial role of private capital 
for the sector became clear once again, this time simply because the Bolivian state did not 
have the capital to expand. Initially after the nationalization of the oil sector, growth did 
increase, especially after Standard Oil turned over maps and geological data to YPFB as 
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part of the 1941 compensation agreement.80  The U.S. government offered a loan to 
Bolivia to build an oil pipeline within the country with the intention of developing the oil 
fields in the oil-rich, eastern department of Santa Cruz.  The refinery, built in the city of 
Sucre, resulted in the increase of the cost of the project.81  The increase in costs and the 
decreasing price of domestic oil consumption began to damage YPFB’s financial 
situation: “YPFB soon found itself in what was to be a characteristic position of technical 
adequacy but financial near-bankruptcy.”82 By the mid-1940s, the Bolivian government 
was seeking foreign investment to aid the declining YPFB.   
In the 1950s, once again we see ongoing reliance of private investment and 
expertise. The period leading up to the 1952 Revolution and the revolution itself 
temporarily halted efforts to attract foreign investment in oil, and in this context YPFB 
managed to boost output significantly, even reaching a period of self-sufficiency.  
Despite the increased successes of YPFB, the state developed the oil code in 1955, 
granting concessions to a number of private oil companies.83  Gulf Oil ended up being 
the most successful and further proposed the construction of the Sica-Sica Arica oil 
pipeline through Chile.84  Unfortunately, because of declining expertise, YPFB was 
unable to produce enough oil to make the pipeline profitable.  Standard Oil had given 
YPFB its maps and geological data, enabling YPFB’s initial success.  However, once the 
company had developed the reserves identified by Standard Oil, the company was unable 
to undertake successful exploration activities.  This decline in expertise, coupled with an 
economic stabilization plan that significantly cut YPFB’s funding, led to an overall 
decline in oil output.85   
                                                 
80 Philip, Oil and Politics in Latin America, 453. 
81 Ibid. The initial plan was to link the Camiri oilfield to a refinery in Cochabamba, but political 
pressures forced the route to change from Cochabamba to Sucre. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid., 456. 
84 Ibid., 457. The agreement between Gulf Oil and the Bolivian government was a result of the 
Bolivian government’s desire to decrease its dependence on Brazilian and Argentine consumption and 
develop other primary exports. 
85 The economic stabilization plan was enacted in 1956. When YPFB approached the state with its 
budget input, the company proposed its lowest expenditure estimate being “pared to the bone” at $14m, the 
Bolivian government allocated the company $10.8 million. Philip, Oil and Politics in Latin America, 456. 
 29
As YPFB was in decline, Gulf Oil was experiencing success as it began producing 
oil in 1962 and selling it to YPFB for domestic sale.86  That year, Gulf Oil petitioned the 
government to begin supplying the department of Santa Cruz with natural gas.87  The 
state never granted permission for Gulf Oil to supply Santa Cruz.  Instead, the 
government drew up plans for Gulf Oil to sell the gas to YPFB, who would then supply 
Santa Cruz.  This decision signaled that it would not be acceptable for any foreign 
company to supply Bolivians with oil or natural gas.  By the mid-1960s, with the decline 
of YPFB and the rise of Gulf Oil, YPFB became a client of Gulf Oil.  Gulf Oil invested 
more and produced significantly more than YPFB during this period. 
Struggles over the public-private balance of control over oil, and ongoing private 
involvement in the sector, continued under military rule. In 1964, General René 
Barrientos seized power in a military coup.  Though nationalization rhetoric had been 
increasing, Barrientos was interested in further development of the industry through 
foreign companies as well as YPFB.  At the same time, he publicly denounced the 1955 
oil code, specifically because it had given concessions to foreign companies.88 
While General Barrientos played to both sides, there was a lingering and 
increasing nationalism growing within the army, which triggered nationalization policies 
starting in the late 1960s.  General Alfredo Ovando was a significant opponent of General 
Barrientos and called for the nationalization of basic industries, to include natural gas, 
which had not been included in the 1955 oil code.  Support within society for 
nationalization was increasing when Barrientos died in a helicopter crash in 1969.  Vice-
President Luis Siles Salines took over the presidency and immediately called for a partial 
nationalization, or at least a renegotiation of contracts.89  In August 1969, Siles 
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introduced a bill to congress to nationalize hydrocarbons.90  On September 26, 1969, 
General Ovando took advantage of Siles’ weak hold on power, seized power, and further 
nationalized Gulf Oil on October 17, 1969.91  An oil and gas boom followed the 
nationalization, due to (1) YPFB capitalizing on the prior work done by Gulf Oil and (2) 
the new construction of the Yacimientos-Bolivian Gulf (YABOG) pipeline to Argentina 
in 1972.   
Beginning in the 1970s, private involvement in Bolivia’s oil sector increased once 
again. In 1971, General Hugo Banzer seized power in a coup.  In 1972, the Banzer 
government passed a new policy opening up the hydrocarbons sector to foreign 
investment.  Although research failed to uncover the reasons for this opening, Philip 
addresses two factors.  First, the opening was the result of political bargaining on the part 
of the Bolivian government, which had received a promise of financial and technical aid 
from the USSR in return for the restoration of diplomatic relations in the 1960s.92  The 
Bolivian government at the time had no clear intentions of accepting this aid.  However, 
it publicized the event in hopes of receiving aid from the U.S.—a counteroffer to Soviet 
support—to fund exploration activities.93  Although it was explicitly against U.S. policy 
to give aid to state-owned enterprises, the Siles government was able to secure aid from 
the U.S. government.94 A second factor that affected Bolivia’s economic opening was the 
rise to power of an economic conservative from Santa Cruz, General Banzer.  In this 
political climate, the World Bank and Bolivian government arrived at an agreement 
                                                 
90 Philip, Oil and Politics in Latin America, 267. A series of moves by Gulf Oil during this period 
sought to weaken President Siles’ position. Gulf Oil first sought help from the World Bank to pressure the 
Bolivian government to forgo nationalization. When that tactic failed, the company offered free natural gas 
to Santa Cruz for 20 years.  The offer enraged Siles’ opposition, who contended that this type of activity 
would result in a backlash by others in need of the resource. 
91 Ibid., 269. 
92 Ibid., 102. 
93 Ibid., 103. 
94 Philip suggests that the U.S. decision hinged on the events of the Cuban Revolution. Ibid., 103. 
 31
according to which the Bank agreed to fund a new natural gas pipeline to Argentina, and 
the government compensated Gulf Oil following the company’s expropriation.95  
Even amid the oil boom of the 1970s, the weakness of YPFB’s capacity showed. 
Throughout the 1970s, YPFB enjoyed great success, due to the new pipeline to Argentina 
and high oil prices.96  In fact, many government authorities came to rely on oil revenues, 
which the state disproportionately directed toward the department of Santa Cruz.97  
However, irresponsible spending and decreasing oil prices began to cause financial 
difficulty for YPFB.  According to Kohl and Farthing, the success of the hydrocarbons 
industry was short-lived as Bolivian debt continued to grow, and when crisis hit in the 
1980s, Bolivia privatized state industries yet again.98  
As illustrated in this section, governments in Bolivia implemented policies to 
encourage or increase private investment in the oil then natural gas sector on many 
occasions. This discussion illustrates that the state has exhibited weak capacity in 
hydrocarbons on an ongoing basis. 
B. ECUADOR: PRIVATE DISCOVERY FOLLOWED BY PUBLIC 
SQUANDERING  
Ecuador, like Bolivia, has an economically important and politically salient 
natural resource sector, ranking fourth highest in oil reserves in the Latin American 
region.99  Like Bolivia, the utility of oil has been known for centuries: it was turned into 
tar and used for a number of things before the Spanish conquest and later fell under the 
control of the Spanish conquerors.  Standard Oil also came to Ecuador, as it did to 
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Bolivia, in 1921.100  Similarly, private involvement in the industry in Ecuador has been 
as important and necessary as it has been in Bolivia.  The case of Ecuador differs from 
Bolivia in that Bolivians were the original claimants of oil and encouraged foreign 
involvement to help develop the industry.  In contrast, in Ecuador, the Texas-Gulf 
consortium made the first significant discovery.   
Texaco-Gulf’s 1967 discovery of large amounts of crude oil launching an 
economic boom in 1972, when the company began transporting oil through the Trans-
Ecuadorian Pipe Line, Sistema Oleducto Trans-Ecuatoriano (SOTE).101 The SOTE 
pipeline begins in Nueva Loja in the northeast province of Sucumbíos, rises 13,000 feet 
to cross the Andes, and ends at the Pacific port of Balao in Esmeraldas province.102  The 
pipeline was privately funded and built and was to be privately operated for 25 years.103  
The SOTE pipeline initially transported 250,000 barrels per day, but as time went on it 
was enlarged in order to meet production, demand, and expected increases in oil 
production.104   
As evidence of just how reliant Ecuador’s government was on the private sector, 
as of 1966 the Ecuadorian government was aware that it did not have the capacity to 
effectively administer, control, and regulate the industry.105  Eventually this situation 
forced the Ecuadorian government to renegotiate concessions established in 1969.  The 
government also had to re-establish its state company, Corporacíon Estatal Petrolera 
Ecuatoriana (CEPE), which it had initially established under questionable legal terms.106   
As was true in Bolivia, military rule in Ecuador brought to power governments 
with nationalist tendencies, in general and in particular in hydrocarbons. In 1972, General 
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Guillermo Rodriguez Lara headed a coup d’état which ushered in a period of military 
rule.  The military government felt at this point that “the corrupt politicians would not 
make good guardians of the nation’s recently discovered wealth and believed that the 
military was entitled to share in the abundance.”107  During the 1970s, the government 
took steps to increase state control in Ecuador’s hydrocarbons sector, first with the 
formation of CEPE (mentioned above) and the gradual takeover of private companies 
throughout the sector.  At this time, General Rodriguez Lara appointed a new Natural 
Resources Minister, Naval Captain Gustavo Jarrín Ampudia, who lacked a firm 
background in this area but was nonetheless a staunch nationalist that envisioned a 
gradual nationalization of the sector.108   
Jarrín immediately brought together a group of Ecuadorians and foreigners 
experienced in the sector and sympathetic to nationalization.109  At this point, Jarrín 
seemed well positioned to nationalize the industry; with the discovery of the oil reserves 
and the foreign investment already committed, he believed that the Ecuadorian 
government had the advantage.  
The first actions that Jarrín took concerned the Texas-Gulf consortium.  The 
government issued Decree 430, mandating the renegotiation of contracts.  The biggest 
impact of the decree had to do with territory.  Jarrín wanted to ensure that CEPE regained 
a large amount of Texas-Gulf’s territory so that the state could play a significant part in 
the future development of the industry.110  For Jarrín, sacrificing immediate wealth could 
offer more benefits in the end, as the state-owned company at this time was unable to 
develop the land effectively.  Eager for immediate development and wealth, conservative 
groups opposed this idea.  By 1973, all parties agreed upon the new contracts.  Texas-
Gulf gave back a large amount of territory and agreed to invest further in the industry and 
increase production, and finally CEPE was able to buy 25 percent of the consortium.111  
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Because of these contract renegotiations, as well as increased taxes on the sector, Gulf 
Oil demanded its own nationalization.  In September 1974, Gulf Oil’s holdings came 
under CEPE control, and at this point CEPE controlled 62.5 percent of the consortium.112 
During the 1970s, Ecuadorians greatly benefited from the increased oil wealth.  
Ecuador joined OPEC and complied with the production ceiling intended to increase 
revenues for oil producing countries.113  Throughout the period of military rule, a number 
of social and political entities received a portion of the oil revenues, with the military 
receiving the largest share.114  To support its policy of import-substituted 
industrialization (ISI) to stimulate industry and employment, the government directed a 
portion of the oil revenues toward industrial development.115  The government also used 
large subsidies to address consumer demand and encourage economic growth: by 1978, 
approximately one-half of the budget was devoted to food and energy subsidies, 
exemptions, and credits.116   
The Rodriguez Lara government began to lose support in the mid-1970s because 
the population believed that the benefits from the oil revenues were not trickling down 
fast enough.  In 1979, the military transferred power to civilians, in response to more 
demands for democracy.  Upon the return to democracy, the new civilian government 
discovered that the military had used oil reserves to borrow large sums of money in order 
to sustain development.117  As a result, foreign debt had grown twentyfold during the 
1970s, from $209 million in 1970 to $4,167 million in 1980.118 
While research does not suggest an objective need for foreign involvement, it 
does continually emphasize that governments throughout the 1970s believed that private 
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foreign involvement was important, especially when Ecuador began exporting oil in 
1972, when the industry was very new to the country. For instance, Philip writes, “the 
events of the years 1972–1976 may be regarded as providing something of a learning 
process for Ecuador.”119  Successive governments during this period continued to find 
validity in the governments’ claim in the 1960s that “the state does not dispose of 
sufficient personnel to be able to carry out satisfactorily the administration, control and 
regulation of all aspects of the oil industry.”120  The removal of Jarrín in 1974 from the 
Ministry of Natural Resources for his hard-line, nationalist rhetoric demonstrates such an 
attitude.  Furthermore, after the nationalization of Gulf Oil, the Ecuadorian government 
discouraged any pro-nationalization rhetoric by refusing to turn it into a political issue.  
Governments during these early years were adamant that the state did not have the 
capacity to capitalize on its newfound oil industry.    
Following the return to democracy, in 1989, President Rodrigo Borja took over 
the remaining shares of the Texaco-Gulf consortium, and the state restructured CEPE, 
renaming it Petroecuador.121  Despite the growing state involvement in the sector, 
President Rodrigo Borja denied that he was nationalizing the oil sector and maintained 
that the country needed foreign investment and expertise to modernize and expand the 
industry.122  With increased state involvement, however, the Ecuadorian government had 
its own source of revenue, diminishing its historic dependence on the oligarchy, which 
traditionally controlled economic and political resources.123  Ecuador was able to 
modernize its economy and create many new jobs with the oil revenues (and international 
lending agencies, a result of the militaries’ borrowing activities mentioned above).  
Ecuadorians then came to depend on oil and international lending agencies to fund  
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development.  A dramatic drop in oil prices in 1986 significantly affected the country and 
forced the government to reconsider its role in the industry, ultimately triggering 
considerable privatization measures starting in the 1990s. 
To summarize this historical account of Bolivian and Ecuadorian state 
involvement in the hydrocarbons sector, in both cases the state and private companies 
have had a longstanding relationship.  Successive governments in both countries have 
nationalized the industry, while maintaining some degree of private involvement.  
Despite the fact that the popular sector has perceived these companies to be a destructive 
force, no matter how ideologically opposed to the presence of these companies, 
governments have been unable to maintain self-sufficiency in the industry and thus 
require the presence of these entities.  Even though Bolivia and Ecuador have moved 
toward increased state involvement in recent years—claiming that they are “taking back” 
their resources (physically and symbolically)—it seems that they cannot afford to 
abandon foreign involvement altogether.  Grounded in this analysis of continued private-
sector involvement, then, the remainder of this thesis will turn to analyzing the different 
paths by which popular mobilization has encouraged the most recent turn toward state 
involvement in hydrocarbons in the two countries.   
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III. UNDERSTANDING NATIONAL PROTEST IN BOLIVIA BY 
EXAMINING REGIONAL MOBILIZATION AND PROTEST 
The prior chapter demonstrated that historically, the public-private balance in the 
hydrocarbons sector in both Bolivia and Ecuador has shifted multiple times, though 
across all periods, some degree of private investment has remained critical. The analysis 
now turns to analyzing social mobilization behind the most recent nationalization 
measures. This chapter focuses on Bolivia, and the following chapter will analyze the 
Ecuadorian case. 
In Bolivia, social mobilization surrounding hydrocarbons—specifically, natural 
gas—has been intense over the past decade, involving a nationwide support base that 
transcends social sectors that emerged to protest against natural gas policies.  These 
events took place in the Andean regions with no hydrocarbon activity, with mostly 
indigenous populations based in the same region attending and leading protests.  
Curiously, though indigenous groups from the gas-rich regions of Bolivia supported these 
protests in principle, they were absent from the main protest events and did not carry out 
protests in their own region.  This behavior is particularly puzzling, given that analyses of 
Bolivia’s indigenous movements have recognized lowland indigenous groups as 
politically mobilized and prone to protest.124  Furthermore, given that Bolivia’s regional 
indigenous movements are notoriously strong in their own right but lack the ability to 
establish a cohesive national movement, it is curious that a nationwide support base—
including several separate indigenous groups—was formed in support of nationalizing 
natural gas.   
This chapter explores the mobilization behind the nationalization of the 
hydrocarbons sector.  The mobilization of indigenous groups as well as other sectors of 
the population played a significant role in hydrocarbon policy outcomes and most 
significantly the nationalization in 2006.  The analysis places this mobilization within a 
broader context of general frustration with the government and its privatizing policies in 
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the early 2000s.  Protests quickly gained momentum, as we will see in the first water war 
of 2000, the subsequent gas war of 2003, a second water war in 2005 and the second gas 
war of 2005.  The rise of Evo Morales and his MAS party at the time presented the 
popular sector with an important political alternative.  Though the water wars began 
locally, they did gain a significant amount of popular support that encouraged 
mobilization during the gas wars, since many of the participants were the same in both 
cases.  The plight of the populations that initiated the water wars gained national 
notoriety, adding to widespread discontent with the state’s economic policies.  A 
proposed plan to export natural gas through Chile was also a factor in the mobilizing of 
the gas wars, because it hit a nationalist nerve.125 
This chapter will analyze the events and actors interested in affecting hydrocarbon 
policy.  First, I will highlight anti-privatization policy protests among Andean actors, 
which are located farthest away from the natural gas industry.  A description of the 
emergence of these organizations will follow, highlighting why protests gained national 
support.  I will then describe the lowland indigenous organizations and communities from 
the natural gas region of Bolivia, in order to highlight the relative weakness of these 
groups compared to the Andean groups.  The analysis will then identify factors that 
explain this relative weakness of lowland indigenous groups.   
A. NATIONAL-LEVEL PROTEST AGAINST HYDROCARBON POLICIES  
Bolivia’s indigenous organizations have a long history of protest.  An 
examination of these protests is important in order to understand the current state of the 
hydrocarbons sector in Bolivia.  There have been a number of protests by indigenous and 
non-indigenous organizations living in the Andean region of Bolivia, as well as oil 
workers.  The nationalization of gas came on the heels of the so-called gas wars in 2003 
and 2005.  This section describes the major protests surrounding hydrocarbons since the 
significant gas discoveries in the 1990s. 
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1. Anti-Privatization Protests by Unions and Andean Organizations 
When the Bolivian government began to privatize industries as part of its 
neoliberal economic reform policies, the hydrocarbons industry was among them.  
Although capitalization limited private ownership to 50 percent of the shares of YPFB, in 
1996 President Sanchez de Lozada offered Enron 55 percent of the state company’s 
shares, igniting mass protest against the granting of majority ownership to a private 
company.126  In response to protests, the state sent the armed forces to refineries and 
natural gas facilities to avoid any interruption in production.127  Tensions were apparently 
relieved when Enron decreased its purchase to 42 percent, and Shell bought the 
remaining shares, eight percent.128   
During this same time, another struggle was taking place.  Reports suggest that 
during these protest events in 1996, leaders of the YPFB petroleum workers’ union 
reached agreements with the government, ensuring oil refineries and oil and natural gas 
pipelines would remain in state hands.129  The agreement further stipulated that YPFB 
would remain responsible for handling the domestic sale of hydrocarbons products.130  
Conflict arose surrounding the construction of a new pipeline.  According to reports 
during this period, the government, oil workers, and unions—especially the main labor 
union (Central Obrera Boliviana, COB)—agreed on the need for a pipeline, which would 
require foreign investment to pay for construction.131  At this point, unions and 
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opposition party members maintained that foreign investment was possible without 
selling YPFB, but Sanchez de Lozada thought it necessary to privatize the company.132  
The privatization of the hydrocarbons sector continued to be a contentious topic among 
Bolivians, with another round of protests among industry workers in 1998 after the state 
partially rescinded its agreement on refineries and pipelines, selling off refineries to 
private hydrocarbons companies.133   
The above protests beginning in 1996 mark a 10-year period in which the 
hydrocarbons industry was privatized, resulting in protests to bring the industry back 
under the control of the state.  The main initiators and participants were labor union 
members from the YPFB petroleum workers-union and the COB, although workers from 
many other sectors also joined in the protests.134  It is important to note here that the 
Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), 
Bolivia’s main Andean indigenous organization, retained close ties with the COB, and 
participated in some anti-privatization protests in the 1990s.135  As we will see, these 
cross-sector relationships will be an important factor in the national level mobilization 
around the nationalization of the hydrocarbons sector. 
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2. The Gas War 2003 
Objection to privatization policies continued to simmer, and a significant round of 
protests began in September 2003, lasting six weeks.136  Protestors demanded that 
Bolivia use its natural resources for development and not sell resources to foreign 
companies at low prices.137  The massive protests against the privatization of the natural 
gas sector, and industry activities in general, did not lead to policy change in these areas.  
Furthermore, state participation in this sector failed to reach the levels desired by 
protestors, who demanded state involvement in oversight of the industry, state ownership 
rights, consultations by the oil companies with local communities in gas regions, and an 
increased share of the revenues for non-producing departments. 
The issue that triggered the Gas War in 2003 was the government’s plan to export 
natural gas through a Chilean port to the Pacific Ocean.  The plan was controversial for 
two reasons.  First, it would move Bolivia’s gas through Chile, a longtime rival of Bolivia 
and the reason that Bolivia was landlocked.138  Second, estimates found that Chile would 
sell the exported gas to Mexico and the United States for more than 20 times the amount 
it would pay to Bolivia’s government.139  Protestors also demanded greater access to 
Bolivia’s natural resources.  In this case, natural gas would be useful in producing diesel, 
heat, electricity, and fertilizers.140   
In addition to protests against the export arrangement and access, environmental 
issues were also at stake during the Gas War of 2003.  One highly visible case was an oil 
spill in Bolivia’s Desaguadero River in January 2000 by Transredes, a subsidiary of 
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Enron and Shell that affected more than 30,000 residents.141  Investigations and 
Transredes employed doctor’s reports on the incident found that the population in the 
area suffered no significant damage and the companies involved were not responsible.142  
However, research published in 2008 suggests that communities are still experiencing the 
affects of the spill.143  A number of other popular sectors also had a stake in the national 
protest, among them the national trade union confederation, which called for a 
renationalization of the hydrocarbons industry in order for the state to regain control of 
the revenues for development projects.144   
Another group of communities, organized by the Federación de Juntas Vecinales 
(FEJUVE) participated, protested property taxes alongside protests against natural gas 
policy.145 In October 2003, 200,000 people—including members of Andean indigenous 
communities, neighborhood associations, and labor unions, as well as street traders and 
university students—came together to protest the government’s economic policies.146  
State violence to quell the protests only made matters worse as protestors called for the 
resignation of Sanchez de Lozada.147  In October 2003, the violent protests of the gas 
wars forced Sanchez de Lozada to resign.  His Vice President, Carlos Mesa, was sworn 
into the presidency following this event.   
3. The Second Gas War 2005 
The swearing in of Mesa did not stop anti-privatization protests.  Once Mesa 
became president, he immediately distanced himself from Sanchez de Lozada’s gas 
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policy, promising legislation change.  The new hydrocarbon law signaled progress but 
was not sufficient to stop protests and ease the pressure on Mesa, as Andean indigenous 
leaders and COB leaders maintained that the industry needed to be nationalized.148  
Leaders of these organizations continued to stage strikes and protests, and in June 2005 
congress accepted Mesa’s resignation. 
In sum, in instances of protests surrounding the privatization and exportation of 
natural gas resources, the participating groups included a significant mix of the popular 
sectors residing in the Andean region of Bolivia.  Petroleum workers, union members, 
indigenous organizations, and neighborhood associations were all instrumental in 
bringing together large populations for protest events.  Notably, these protests lacked the 
presence of a significant group: the indigenous organizations from the oil and natural gas 
rich regions of Bolivia.149  
B. EXPLAINING NATIONAL MOBILIZATION SURROUNDING 
HYDROCARBONS 
The above analysis described the gas protests, highlighting one key factor that 
contributed to the formation of a national movement, opposition to exporting gas through 
Chile. In Chapter I, we saw that the harsh nature of neoliberal reforms—including 
privatization—further served to spur protest in favor of nationalizing the gas sector. The 
remainder of the chapter will highlight additional factors that contributed to the formation 
of the national movement: the water wars protests, which represent the beginning of the 
backlash against neoliberalism and which brought together different sectors of society; 
and the emergence of first and second-generation Andean indigenous movements, who 
played a significant role in the protests.  In addition, the analysis will also discuss 
indigenous populations that reside in the oil-rich region of Bolivia to demonstrate their 
limited role with respect to the natural gas industry. 
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1. Water Wars Spark Discontent Across Many Popular Sectors 
The massive protests known as Bolivia’s water wars in the Andean region of 
Cochabamba began in November 1999.  These protests were the culmination of years of 
water mismanagement.  In this context, the World Bank threatened to withhold aid if 
Bolivia’s government did not privatize the water sector, pressuring the government into 
privatizing Cochabamba’s water resources in 1996.150  This protest event was important 
in bringing together a number of actors, many of whom were the same participants in the 
gas wars.  These events gained widespread national support as populations grew more 
agitated with the government’s economic policies, especially its preference for private 
involvement in the economy. 
Responding to World Bank pressure, the government contracted with Aguas del 
Tunari, a subsidiary of the Bechtel Company.151  The 1999 Water Law 2029, passed 
during the contracting process, “favored the use of water by international companies for 
mining, agriculture, and electrical purposes over human consumption.”152  The law did 
not guarantee equal access to water and prohibited the rural use of alternative distribution 
systems.153  Concretely, the law meant that people were billed for any water they might 
consume, including water piping in their homes, collected rainwater, and water in 
community wells.154  In accordance with the new law, the contract with Aguas del Tunari 
granted the private, international consortium control of irrigation systems and community 





                                                 







they did not use water.  This contract also extended to communities using wells that they 
had built with their own money.156  In some areas of the region, water rates increased by 
as much as 200 percent.157 
The government’s water privatization measures triggered considerable popular 
mobilization. In a context of high prices for such a critical resource—given the 
importance of water for agriculture and basic living needs—in November 1999 the 
people of Cochabamba began protesting, demanding a change to Water Law 2029.  These 
groups felt that they were entitled to water rights through customary law and that these 
rights were sacred according to Andean worldview.158  The first groups to protest were 
mostly small farmers, but more groups joined in upon receiving their high water bills at 
the end of 1999.159  These groups, made up of urban workers, rural peasant irrigators, 
members of local water collectives, students, and ordinary Cochabambans organized 
themselves into the Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida (Coalition in 
Defense of Water and Life-Coordinadora).160  In response to massive protests in January 
2000, government officials said that they could revise the law but not the rate increases.  
When protests did not let up, the government agreed to review the groups’ demands and 
respond within three months.161  Protests broke out again in February and grew violent 
with police sending tear gas into the crowds.  In response to the unrest, the government 
froze price increases on water.  In March, Coordinadora (the organization leading the 
protests) organized a referendum in Cochabamba, in which 96 percent of the voters 
favored canceling the privatization contract.  On April 10, 2000, government officials 
met with personnel from Coordinadora and agreed to reject the contract with Aguas del 
Tunari and give control back to SEMAPA, the public water company.   
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Aside from the privatization of Cochabamba’s water system, the state also 
privatized the water systems of El Alto and La Paz in 1997, a condition attached to a 
World Bank loan.  The state gave control of El Alto’s water system to Aguas de Illimani, 
a private consortium owned partly by the French company Suez and a number of other 
small shareholders.162  The privatization of the water systems in El Alto resulted in rate 
increases of 35 percent, increases in the cost for initial sewage and water hookups and 
diminished access to water for more than 200,000 people living in the outskirts of El 
Alto.163  Small protests had taken place since the privatization.  These mobilizations were 
not effective until FEJUVE organized these communities.164  
The successes of these organizations were widely heralded as a victory against 
corporate globalization and a direct result of the neoliberal reforms in Bolivia, which 
stripped the people of their material inheritance and natural resources.165  As Postero 
points out, this struggle was based on the defense of cultural heritage and collective 
“indigenous rights” to water, and although it was not purely an indigenous struggle, it did 
come to adopt indigenous ideals of the protection of traditional custom and usages, or 
customary law (usos y costumbres).166  This massive protest was the precursor to the 
hydrocarbon protest events and many of the same organizations lent their support to the 
Gas War struggles.   
C. NATIONAL INDIGENOUS SUPPORT FOR THE GAS WARS 
If the water wars protests against the water sector privatization gained national 
notoriety and signified widespread discontent with economic policies, while also spurring  
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the formation of groups that would also participate directly in the gas wars, another 
critical factor behind the national character of the gas wars was the coming together of 
regional indigenous organizations. 
 Indigenous populations nationwide also lent their support to the Gas War protests 
despite the historic regional divide.  Bolivia’s indigenous organizations have tried to 
unify but have been unable to identify shared interests concerning identity and land 
reform.167  Despite these difficulties, organizations still have hopes of unifying under a 
national movement and strive for consensus on issues.  With the anticipation of a national 
indigenous organization, lowland indigenous people were in favor of the Gas War 
protests in the Andean region.  However, regional identities serve as an obstacle against 
unifying indigenous organizations in general and more specifically around hydrocarbons 
policies, and the lack of state control over the industry produced trans-regional 
discontent.  Postero suggests that the gas wars “represented a fairly important shift, 
publicly linking the agendas of lowlands and highlands indigenous groups.”168  This 
shared discontent led lowland indigenous groups to declare their support though a public 
press report for the gas wars that took place in the Andes.169  This section analyzes the 
politicization of Bolivia’s highland indigenous movements, which were critical actors in 
the national gas wars.  
a. First Generation Andean Indigenous Movements: Union 
Identities 
Understanding the development of first generation indigenous movements 
in the Andean region of Bolivia is important to understand the identity of today’s 
movements.  The union (or sindicato) identity still remains today and is even present in 
eastern indigenous groups, where union identities were not historically strong.170  The 
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CSUTCB is significant in that it played a major role in the gas wars and has been an 
important support base for President Evo Morales (the first indigenous president, 2006-
present) and his MAS party.  The Andean movements are situated the farthest from areas 
of natural gas exploitation but are able to mobilize a strong movement around the 
nationalization of the hydrocarbons industry.   
The first significant Andean indigenous movement, the Kataristas, formed 
in the 1970s and the 1980s.  These groups emerged as a result of the 1952 Revolution and 
the subsequent rise to power by the MNR.  A major MNR goal was to incorporate 
indigenous communities into the political system by extending citizenship rights and 
universal suffrage.171  The party also allowed peasants to hold political positions while 
also expanding education to the countryside.  Through these actions, the MNR extended 
benefits to indigenous groups by labeling them as peasants.   
The first salient issue that the MNR addressed was land reform.  Until this 
time, only eight percent of landholders held 95 percent of Bolivia’s cultivable land, of 
which only 0.8 percent had been cultivated.172  The land reform distributed land in three 
ways.  First, it distributed land to those who could demonstrate their pre-1953 use or 
occupation of land parcels that were otherwise unclaimed.  Second, it expropriated land 
owned by large landowners (latifundios) and redistributed it to their tenant farmers.  
Third, it promoted colonization away from crowded population centers.173  Along with 
land reform, the MNR incorporated peasant communities into national politics by 
institutionalizing peasant unions that were formed before the Revolution.  By doing this, 
the government hoped to gain control over these communities by way of the unions.174  
In an effort to ensure the spread of union membership, the MNR provided benefits for 
participation, which included the ability to gain legal land rights.  These MNR policies in 
fact did not successfully transform Bolivia’s indigenous people into peasants. In fact, the 
land reform resulted in a new sense of autonomy for many Andean indigenous 
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communities; while the communities took on union names and membership, they retained 
their indigenous customs, authority structures, and practices at the local level.175   
This period of incorporating indigenous communities changed 
dramatically with the military takeover and installment of General Barrientos’ regime in 
1964.176  The military regime sought to break the ties between the peasant unions and the 
MNR in order to bring the unions closer to the new regime by installing its own union 
leaders and limiting union activity.  With the military takeover, unions no longer 
connected the communities and the state and came to represent merely a link between the 
regime and the unions, leaving out the communities.177  Eventually the military regime 
began to reallocate state resources away from these peasant communities toward the more 
lucrative agro-business interests.  The state’s commitment to the peasant communities 
diminished as large landholders began to receive more benefits from the state and 
creditors.178  At this point indigenous mobilization began in the Andean region of 
Bolivia.  The movements that emerged highlighted the importance of the indigenous 
identity.  Networking began within the cities, and members then moved back to their 
local communities to organize further.   
Critical to this ethnic organizing was the mobilization along ethnic lines.  
In 1978, in order to consolidate organizing efforts, indigenous leaders established the 
CSUTCB.  The movement made its first mark in 1979 with blockades following the 
state’s announcement of an economic package that would freeze prices for agricultural 
goods and raise prices for fuel and commodities.179  This event is important in that it 
highlights the confederation’s claim that its members were “heirs to a permanent struggle 
against all forms of exploitation and pressure.”180  It went further to denounce the MNR 
land reforms, calling instead for communal property rights instead of individual property 
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rights, along with communal political autonomy and customary law.181  The catalyst 
behind the emergence of CSUTCB was initially land reform, but their emergence 
signaled the beginning of indigenous mobilizing on various issues.  The union roots of 
these organizations signify that Andean indigenous populations retain multiple identities, 
which enabled them to mobilize with other sectors of society for the renationalization of 
the hydrocarbons industry. 
b. The Second Generation: The Cocaleros  
The first generation Andean movements were the first movements to 
emphasize the indigenous identity in their mobilization.  As a result, these movements 
provided the example for second-generation movements to follow in their own 
development.  The most significant second-generation movement is the Cocaleros, 
located mainly in the Chapare region in Cochabamba.  Like the CSUTCB, this movement 
is not located in the hydrocarbons rich region of Bolivia but became a significant force in 
the renationalization of the industry.   
The catalyst behind the mobilization of this organization was the 
implementation of the NEP in 1985.  One of the most significant reforms was the 
privatization and closure of state mining enterprises, which resulted in the dismissal of 
thousands of workers, most of them indigenous migrants.182  These events had a 
significant impact on the indigenous communities and migrant workers.  Yashar points 
out that the reforms “obliterated the historically important mining sector, liberalized 
agricultural prices, and liberalized trade.”183  Most of the tin miners were indigenous 
migrants, and when the state shut down tin enterprises, many families lost income.  
Communities from which the miners originated were unable to absorb the workers 
following the closures.  In this context, many workers moved to the Chapare region to 
cultivate coca.184  At this point, it is important to note how privatization of the mining 
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industry affected indigenous communities in the 1980s.  Just a decade later, the 
communities most affected by privatization of an SOE would be aggressively demanding 
the renationalization of another SOE, the natural gas industry.  When analyzing the 
impetus to mobilize around the nationalization of natural gas, not only can nationalization 
result in increased revenue to the state, which can translate to social benefits, but it also 
represented a backlash to the privatization events that took place in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Following the tin mine closures, the population in the Chapare region 
increased with the growth of the coca industry.  The coca grower’s movement then 
emerged, holding their first Andean Council of Coca Production in 1991 and electing 
their first president, Evo Morales, at their second meeting in 1993.185  The movement 
linked itself to CSUTCB and argued for the legalization of coca consumption and 
production.   
The Cocalero movement became a prominent player in indigenous 
organizing and political participation.  Taking advantage of the 1994 Law of Popular 
Participation (LPP)—a municipal-level decentralization law that created local political 
competition in Bolivia—it developed a new political party, the Asamblea para la 
Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP).  In 1997, the ASP unsuccessfully fielded an 
organization member for president but successfully fielded four members as national 
deputies for the 1997-2002 term, including Evo Morales.186   
Morales and his support base began to stand out for their politically 
powerful activism.  During his tenure as national deputy, Morales was expelled from the 
legislature on charges that he had instigated protest and violence among Cocaleros.187  
Due to differences between Morales and another ASP member, Morales broke with the 
CSUTCB and accepted the leadership of MAS.  Following his expulsion, Morales began 
to campaign for president.188  Morales came in second in 2002 with 21 percent of the  
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vote; just behind Sanchez de Lozada who won with 22.5 percent of the vote.  Morales 
and his MAS party enjoyed the closest number of votes to a dominant party since the 
1952 Revolution.189   
Despite the 2002 defeat, Morales and MAS became significant national 
political forces.190  MAS not only appealed to indigenous groups but also to the old Left, 
campesino and workers unions, neighborhood associations, and some lowland indigenous 
organizations.191  Following the resignations of Sanchez de Lozada and Mesa after the 
gas wars in 2003 and 2005, Morales was elected to the presidency in 2005 and reelected 
in 2009.  MAS currently holds a majority in the chamber of deputies and 12 elected seats 
in the senate.192   
In sum, first and second generation Andean indigenous movements were 
significant in the construction of a contentious civil society environment in Bolivia.  
These organizations supported anti-privatization of the hydrocarbon industry and were 
instrumental in the gas wars protests that forced two presidents to resign.  The Andean 
indigenous movements have been a strong, aggressive political force in Bolivian politics.  
Although they are not located in the hydrocarbons region of Bolivia, they were and 
remain today committed to renationalization and greater state control of the sector.    
D. THE DECLINING STRENGTH OF THE AMAZON/CHACO 
INDIGENOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN EASTERN BOLIVIA 
In stark contrast to the high level of participation of highland indigenous groups 
in the gas wars, the indigenous movements located in Bolivia’s gas regions have been 
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notably absent from the protests due to their inability to organize because of geography, 
right-wing autonomy movements, and Bolivia’s regional divide.  This section explains 
the lack of participation of indigenous organizations centered in Bolivia’s gas regions in 
the national protests. 
Bolivia’s hydrocarbon-rich east is home to a small number of indigenous 
communities.  Many scholars refer to Eastern Bolivia as the Amazon region; however, it 
will be clearer to refer to the entire region as the lowlands, differentiating between the 
Amazon and the Chaco.  The largest indigenous population in the east is the Guaraní, 
who live mostly in the Chaco region.  The Guaraní have experienced significant victories 
and setbacks.  Though they have been very instrumental in mobilizing the indigenous 
groups in the east, they were largely absent from the Gas War protests and continue to 
have very little influence in hydrocarbon activities.193  This section will first describe the 
Guaraní’s limited protest surrounding hydrocarbon policy in recent years.  It will then 
show how curious this paralysis is by describing the Guaraní’s history of activism.  
Finally, it will explain the paralysis by pointing to factors that limit the organizational 
capacity and cohesion of this group.  
Indigenous organizations in the lowlands gained significant notoriety throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s for their ability to negotiate with the central government.  For 
instance, the first significant round of protests led by lowland indigenous communities 
occurred in 1990.  The “March for Territory and Dignity” was organized by lowland 
indigenous organizations, specifically a Confederación Indígena del Oriente de Bolivia 
(CIDOB) member organization, the Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni (CPIB), 
demanding state recognition of indigenous territory.194  Leaders of CPIB complained that 
thousands of indigenous people were in danger of losing their territory, identity, and 
culture.195  The march began in the Beni and ended after 34 days, in La Paz with eight 
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hundred marchers, a majority of whom were from the lowlands, though campesinos and 
Cocaleros also joined the march.196  The march was successful; through four executive 
decrees, President Paz Zamora granted the indigenous people the territory that they 
claimed.197 If CPIB is well known for the 1990 territory and dignity march, the lowland 
regional organization CIDOB—to which CPIB belongs—would ultimately be hailed as 
the most important indigenous organization in Bolivia during those years.  Despite the 
fact that this organization and others enjoyed a number of successes early on, they have 
not mobilized against hydrocarbon policies in any significant manner.  This section will 
argue that strong, elite-led civic committees, geography, and regionalism have all served 
as obstacles to the cohesive alliance of lowland indigenous communities, especially those 
in the Chaco region.   
1. Lowland Indigenous Protest: Failed Attempts at Policy Change 
As Andean indigenous groups protested privatization in the 2000s, indigenous 
groups in the lowlands were increasingly feeling the effects of the neoliberal reforms as 
transnational hydrocarbons companies began to enter the region.198  The capitalization of 
the hydrocarbons industry resulted in a significant increase in exploration, extraction, and 
transportation activity by companies who were free to carry out these activities with very 
little oversight from the state.199  The environmental office responsible for overseeing 
industry activities was itself funded by the private companies operating at the time.200   
a. The Chiquitano Indians and the Pipeline Project 
In response to the expanding hydrocarbons activities in the region, 
Chiquitano Indians began a 16-day protest in 2000 to stop work on a pipeline project that 
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would intersect their territories.201  Though the protest negotiations did not heed the 
Chiquitanos’ primary demand, which was the rerouting of the pipeline, the oil companies 
did establish a conservation fund, “designed to mitigate the social and environmental 
damage caused by the pipeline.”202  Nonetheless, according to scholars, the creation of 
the fund was only a small victory when compared to the damage that these companies did 
in terms of oil spills and gas leaks, among other forms of environmental and social 
degradation.203  The plight of the Chiquitanos became known throughout Bolivia and 
worldwide and fueled the unrest that was critical in the gas wars protest. 
As Chiquitano Indians protested the path of a pipeline, other lowland 
indigenous organizations marched in 2002 to demand a constituent assembly to address 
the interests and values of the indigenous and popular sectors.204  Specifically, the 
indigenous groups demanded territorial rights and control of the natural resources within 
these territories, as well as autonomous territories controlled by indigenous groups.205  
The march for the constituent assembly was a failure, due to long-held divisions within 
the CIDOB, namely those concerning support of the Movimiento de la Izquierda 
Revolucionario (MIR) party and the MAS party.  These divisions intensified with the 
country nearing national elections and ultimately affected the cohesiveness and 
organizational strategies of the regional movement.206  Postero argues that although these  
 
 
                                                 
201 Postero, Now We Are Citizens, 202. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Hindery, “Social and Environmental Impacts of World Bank/IMF-Funded Economic Restructuring 
in Bolivia,” 295; Postero, Now We Are Citizens, 202. Hindery and Postero both cite four major oil spills 
and a gas leak, though they do not include more specific information,  
204 Postero, Now We Are Citizens, 203. 
205 This protest came after the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had 
extended an aid agreement on a co-management project between the Bolivian government and the 
Capitanía del Alto y Bajo Izozog (CABI), an organization representing Guaraní communities. In the late 
1990s, CABI had established an agreement with the state to co-manage the Kaa-Iya del Gran Chaco Park 
and use the revenues from the pipeline intersecting the park for social and environmental projects. Nick 
Winer, “Co-management of Protected Areas, the Oil and Gas Industry and Indigenous Empowerment—the 
Experience of Bolivia’s Kaa Iya del Gran Chaco,” Policy Matters no. 12 (September 2003): 185; Postero, 
Now We Are Citizens, 203. 
206 Postero, Now We Are Citizens, 203. 
 56
events were overall failures, they did mark the eastern indigenous organizations as an 
important political force.207  These protests also illustrate the waning influence of 
lowland indigenous groups. 
b. The Guaraní and Hydrocarbons: Ideological Support for 
Renationalization Backed by Limited Protest  
The eastern indigenous organizations were virtually absent from the gas 
wars.  Nonetheless, the organizations supported both nationalization and increased 
oversight and compensation for environmental damage from the private companies 
operating in the region. The Guaraní have an important stake in hydrocarbon policy in 
Bolivia.  These communities, however, do not employ consistently aggressive protest 
strategies and their allegiances are often split between those who adhere to regional 
identities and those who adhere to indigenous identities.  Though Morales enjoys the 
support of eastern indigenous organizations, most notably the CIDOB, there has been a 
weakening of this and other organizations as tensions over land reform, collaboration 
with elite-led civic committees, geography, and regional identities continue being 
obstacles.208 
The Guaraní supported renationalization of the hydrocarbons industry 
before and during the gas wars protests.209  In 2004, the Guaraní staged a peaceful protest 
against Repsol-YPF and Maxus companies’ operations in the Margarita gas field located 
in the southern departments of Tarija and Chuquisaca.  Protestors demanded territorial 
recognition and nationalization of the industry.210  In response, the government agreed to 
allocate a small percentage of revenues for the development of Guaraní communities.211   
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Since the election of Morales and the subsequent nationalization of the industry, the 
Guaraní have been protesting for autonomous indigenous provinces and development 
funds from hydrocarbons companies.212 
In November 2005, the Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (APG) released a 
statement denouncing Repsol-YPF’s activities on the Itika Guasu Tierras Comunitarias 
de Orígen (TCO) in Tarija and accusing them of violating the 2005 hydrocarbon law, 
which explicitly sets the guidelines for consulting with indigenous populations living in 
areas of natural gas exploitation.213  In August 2006, the Guaraní began another protest, 
this time threatening to shut down the pipeline to Brazil and demanding that the pipeline 
operator, Transierra uphold their agreement to invest $9 million in Guaraní communities 
as compensation for the pipeline cutting through their territory.214  These communities 
clearly have an important interest in the natural gas industry, but the state and private 
companies operating in the region have ignored their demands. 
2. Explaining Weak Indigenous Mobilization in the Lowlands 
Protests initiated and led by lowland indigenous groups concerning natural gas 
policy have been relatively weak when compared to the actions of indigenous groups in 
the Andes region.  This is an unexpected development since historically; lowland 
indigenous organizations have been adept at addressing the central government and on 
many occasions have made significant progress in having their demands met.  A history 
of these groups will follow illustrating the relative loss of strength in organizing efforts.  
a. The Amazon/Chaco Indigenous Organizations: A History of 
Significant Mobilization 
Like in the Andean region, a number of strong indigenous organizations 
emerged in the lowlands in the 1980s and 1990s.  These groups began organizing purely 
along ethnic community lines, and in fact, according to Yashar, they surpassed the 
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Andean organizations in their ability to mobilize and confront the state.215  These 
organizations emerged in a way that was opposite to the organizations of the Andes, in 
that the state was mostly absent until the corporatist period when the state, through a 
series of laws, encouraged colonization of the eastern Chaco and Amazon regions.  
Colonization laws stipulated that the state grant land titles to colonists and large 
landholders.  The state also declared lowland indigenous populations as wards of the state 
resulting in their displacement due to their inability to gain legal titles to the lands that 
they had inhabited.  The loss of both land and autonomy served as the catalysts behind 
lowland organizing efforts.  Networking, however, would prove to be an obstacle as the 
population is relatively small and long distances separate these communities.  These 
communities relied on the transcommunity networking left over by church missions.  
However, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were influential in providing support 
and training aimed at building and reinforcing these networks.   
In 1982, indigenous groups established CIDOB in the lowlands of Santa 
Cruz and the Chaco.216  The organizing of indigenous groups in the region emerged 
among the Izoceños-Guaranís, initiated by Bonifacio Barrientos, the “Capítan Grande” of 
Alto y Bajo Izozog.217  CIDOB represented indigenous interests from a number of groups 
such as the Izoceños-Guaranís, the Ayoreos, the Guarayus and the Chiquitanos.  While 
the loss of their land served as the main catalyst to mobilize, a series of laws promulgated 
in the 1970s provided further impetus as these laws limited the communities’ access to 
resources such as water, animals and forest products.218  CIDOB quickly became the 
voice for indigenous communities in an around the Amazon with demands that include 
indigenous territory, organizational autonomy, the right to self government, recognition 
of customary law and the right to cultural survival and development.219 
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It is worthwhile for the purposes of this study to include a separate 
description of the indigenous groups based in the Chaco region of Bolivia, specifically 
focusing on the Guaraní.  The natural gas industry significantly affects these populations, 
as approximately 87.5 percent of natural gas reserves exist in the department of Tarija 
where a number of these communities reside.  The Guaraní are the third largest 
indigenous group in Bolivia, and are mostly subsistence farmers but are also hunters and 
gatherers.  The event that opened up the Oriente (the eastern lowlands) to national 
development was the Chaco War in the 1930s.220  Some Guaraní fled to neighboring 
Argentina and Paraguay during the conflict, others supported Paraguay and worked as 
cattle herders for the army, after the war they were labeled traders and went to Paraguay, 
and yet other groups supported Bolivia and became prisoners in Paraguay until the war 
ended.221  One historian calculates that as many as 15,000 Guaraní either fled or perished 
in the war.222  There are now three main Guaraní groups in Bolivia; the Ava Guaraní 
from the eastern foothills of Santa Cruz and Tarija provinces, the Izoceño Guaraní from 
the Izozo region of Santa Cruz, and the Simba Guaraní from Tarija and Chuquisaca.223   
After the war, the subsequent nationalization of U.S. Standard Oil caused 
a dispute between the U.S. and the Bolivian government.  To settle this dispute, the two 
countries signed the “Bohan Plan” which granted Bolivia $25 million for the economic 
development of the Oriente.224  The revolutionary government of the MNR implemented 
this accord.  The 1953 agrarian and land reforms encouraged migration of the once 
isolated Guaraní groups to urban centers.  In the 1960s and 1970s, international 
development aid further drew a number of families to these areas seeking work in the 
developing sugar and cotton industries.225  The major economic center of Santa Cruz 
now has a significant Guaraní population along with a large Aymara (highland 
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indigenous) population.226  Migrant neighborhoods were erected in the 1970s and 1980s 
mostly housing Aymara colonizers who came as a result of the 1953 land reform, and 
since then these neighborhoods have significantly expanded and now meet the territory 
lines of the Guaraní villages that were once on the very outskirts of the city.227  Though 
large migrant populations live and organize in urban Santa Cruz, a significant population 
remains in the southeast region of Bolivia in Tarija and Chuquisaca, where the major 
natural gas fields and industry are located.   
As Postero points out, the opening of the Oriente presented problems for 
the once isolated Guaraní and other eastern groups, which were in danger of losing their 
lands.228  Because of growing intrusion by the government, large landholders, and 
colonizers, the eastern indigenous groups began to organize.  The Guaraní were 
instrumental in the establishment of CIDOB but also went on to form their own 
organization which represents the interests of Guaraní peoples.  In 1987 the Guaraní 
established the APG with significant support from CIDOB and a Jesuit NGO called 
Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA).229  The Asamblea 
began to promote development and cultural projects throughout Guaraní communities 
and to claim rights to their territorial lands.230 
The Guaraní found a great amount of support in NGOs, but they also 
developed intra- and intercommonal organizations very early.231  In fact, the Guaraní 
leader Bonifacio Barrientos staged a march in the 1930s from Izozog to La Paz to 
demand a community title, which the state granted in 1947.232  Barrientos then became 
the face of lowland indigenous organizing as he advised new leaders to build alliances 
among other indigenous groups and even began to contact these groups between 1978–
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1982, raising awareness of shared grievances and other issues.233  Since that time, the 
wide dispersal of communities has presented a considerable obstacle to organizing. 
Though Guaraní leaders have exhibited a strong dedication to indigenous 
organizing in general, their top priority has been to organize Guaraní communities.  
Because of this dedication, in the 1990s, the APG began a campaign to encourage 
Guaraní communities to organize locally.234  Postero points out that until this time, 
Guaraní communities did not organize in any formal manner and contact came in the 
form of family ties only.235 
Importantly, though the Guaraní have been highly successful in 
mobilizing, there have been limitations to their actual political gains. In the 1990s, the 
state enacted the Law of National Agrarian Reform Institute (Ley de Instituto Nacional de 
Reforma Agraria-INRA), and the Law of Popular Participation established TCOs.  The 
state established these laws to resolve disputed land claims by indigenous groups in the 
eastern lowlands.236  In 1996, Guaraní communities applied for land claims totaling 
10,220,340 hectares, just two years ahead of the discovery of the Margaríta gas field.237  
In 2004, the state awarded only 6.8 percent of the lands that the communities applied for, 
opening up the remaining land to natural resource exploitation.238   
b. Autonomy Movements, Regional Identities, and Limited Power of 
Lowland Indigenous Groups 
Having illustrated the historic strength of mobilizing among the Guaraní, 
the analysis now turns to the obstacles that these groups face in mobilizing against 
hydrocarbon policy. 
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This section will describe why the power of these groups is now so 
limited, in order to understand why the Guaraní have been absent from hydrocarbon 
protest.  It argues that elite-led autonomy movements use strategies to incorporate 
indigenous communities into the departmental autonomy project by appealing to 
indigenous territorial demands.  The indigenous-led central government attempts to 
appeal to these groups by proposing indigenous autonomy regimes, which would be 
responsible only to the central government, bypassing the authority of the elite-led 
eastern departmental governments.  Long held regional divisions only exacerbate the 
position of lowland indigenous groups, in terms of being caught between state versus 
departmental allegiances.   
Many scholars suggest that regionalism in Bolivia is quite pronounced and 
has pitted the west against the east for decades.  The regionalism goes back to the 
Spanish colonial period when the Spanish divided Bolivia up into four large intendencias, 
which still exist today, but with the addition of five more departments.239  Regional 
struggles began in 1899 with a civil war and a resulting state set on centralizing control.  
The 1952 Revolution did much the same thing as the MNR sought to undertake new 
centralizing reforms.240   
In the 1950s, local elites established the Pro-Santa Cruz Civic Committee 
(CPSC) in order to protect their interests.  This organization was initially a counter-
revolutionary group that opposed the MNR.241  Once the MNR took power, it sought to 
suppress regional elections.242  Eaton suggests that the elimination of municipal elections 
closed an important political space, which resulted in the strengthening of civic 
committees and civic movements.243  At this point large agribusinesses that produced 
sugar, wheat, cotton, soy and beef replaced traditional haciendas.244  The land reforms 
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that followed the 1952 Revolution did little in the way of redistribution of land in the 
east, allowing a large amount of land to remain in the hands of a very small elite.245   
The boom of the Santa Cruz economy in the 1970s allowed these elites to 
invest their earnings into other lucrative activities, while maintaining a dominant 
agricultural sector, which remains the strongest in the region.246  The economic growth 
and state resettlement plans brought large numbers of Andean indigenous families to 
Santa Cruz.247  This migration provided the impetus for the intensified regional 
sentiment, because lowlanders felt that they were losing their lands to highland migrants.  
With the rise of indigenous territorial rights, the non-indigenous population presents itself 
as sharing its heritage with the lowland indigenous groups, thus differentiating the 
lowland from the Andean groups in every way.  According to regionalist sentiment, 
“Andean Kollas are trapped in a culturally conservative irrational collectivism derived 
from pre-Colombian and Spanish religious and bureaucratic centralism.”248  This is in 
direct contrast to the Cruceños who represent a modernizing pioneer spirit.249 It is 
therefore important for the non-indigenous to make a distinction between indigenous 
groups as a way of solidifying support for regional demands.  The Cruceños (people of 
Santa Cruz) integrate the lowland indigenous communities into their history by claiming 
that the communities are culturally and racially superior to that of the Andean indigenous 
groups.250 
The CPSC has been historically opposed to centralizing reforms but until 
lately has always enjoyed significant influence in the central government.  The 
indigenous protest events of the early 2000s and the elections of MAS and Morales have 
caused the civic committee to make strong calls for autonomy as it sees its political 
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influence weakening.251  Elite business leaders in Santa Cruz proclaimed a “Camba 
Nation” shortly after protest events in the Andes, and this movement has attracted wide 
support from the popular sector, including indigenous populations in the region.252  Roca 
argues that these actions were in response to the proclamation of an “Aymara nation” by 
Andean indigenous leader Felipe Quispe, and that they represent opposition to the 
perceived advance of the “collas” or Andean population.253  Concretely, CPSC’s 
demands for autonomy include regional control over natural resources, the right to retain 
control over two-thirds of all tax revenues generated in the department, and the authority 
to set all policies other than defense, currency, tariffs, and foreign relations.254   
Some Guaraní have been involved in talks concerning indigenous 
autonomy and the protection of their territories.255  Indigenous autonomy includes the 
control over elections of local authorities and economic-financial resources.256  This 
autonomy is part of the Morales government’s multiple autonomy proposal, which would 
include separate municipal and indigenous autonomies.  Santa Cruz citizens perceive the 
state’s proposal as undermining departmental authority, since according to the 
government’s plan, the municipal governments would be responsible to the central 
government—bypassing anything less (which in this case would be the departmental 
governments).257  The national government argues, however, that it has put forward this 
proposal only to eliminate municipalities’ financial dependence on the central 
government.258   
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Significant conflict has resulted over this issue of multiple autonomies. 
Citizens in Santa Cruz called for mobilization and authorities even went so far as to enact 
the autonomy statutes that citizens had voted for in the autonomy referendum of 2006.259  
In 2007, lowland indigenous communities joined with the Democratic Autonomy 
Committee (an organization that coordinates action in defense of eastern departmental 
autonomies) to sign a “social and political pact” to defend indigenous autonomy.260  The 
Morales administration rejected reports of eastern indigenous leaders signing this pact, 
implying that those who signed were unrepresentative of actual indigenous demands.261  
One constituent assembly delegate who read the pact asserted that the indigenous groups 
in the eastern region were actually divided and afraid of losing their lands.262  There is 
evidence that this is the case since lowland communities fear another large influx of 
Andean immigrants following major land reform legislation.263 
The business leaders who claim that they support new land reform, which 
would determine productive land use and implement stricter rules on large holdings, have 
agreed with calls for land reform in the east.264  The business leaders, however, want the 
state to be clear on who would get this land.  They believe that the land should go to the 
families already established in the region, most importantly lowland indigenous 
families.265  These actions taken by the civic committee, whether genuine or not, serve to 
split eastern indigenous allegiances between Santa Cruz and the central indigenous 
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eastern indigenous organizations, especially since lowland indigenous groups supported 
the gas war protests in the Andes by issuing a public press release declaring their support 
for the protests.266  
In sum, this section has sought to explain why Bolivia’s lowland 
indigenous groups, which have the greatest stake in the hydrocarbons sector since they 
live in the region where natural gas fields are located, have not joined national 
mobilizations surrounding gas policy.  It has found that these indigenous organizations 
experience difficulty organizing due to conflicting beliefs within the organizations about 
allegiances to the national government versus alliances with elite-led regional 
movements.  Government-sponsored land reform continues to be an issue since there is 
concern about migration from the Andean region, which will encroach on indigenous 
people’s land.  The distances between communities also present an obstacle, as it makes 
it difficult for these groups to mobilize.  Finally, regional identities serve to separate them 
ideologically from the indigenous populations of the Andean region.   
E. HYDROCARBON PROTEST IN BOLIVIA: REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS LAG BEHIND A STRONG NATIONAL COALITION 
This chapter has explained the trajectory of indigenous mobilization around 
hydrocarbon policy in Bolivia.  We see that although regional indigenous movements 
have been unable to unite under a national organization, the issue of hydrocarbon policy 
has in fact been a uniting factor.  This national movement was the result of shared 
grievances on natural gas policies, specifically those implemented in order to comply 
with neoliberal economic reforms.  The rise of Evo Morales and MAS contributed to the 
success of natural gas protests as populations searched for a political alternative.  Absent 
from national protests have been lowland indigenous groups, primarily due to influential 
autonomy movements that neutralize indigenous organizations and also exploit Bolivia’s 
regional divide.     
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IV. EFFECTIVE REGIONAL INDIGENOUS ORGANIZING IN 
ECUADOR  
In the prior chapter on indigenous mobilization in Bolivia, we saw that a 
nationally supported movement was a critical catalyst for the increased role of the state in 
the natural gas sector.  Despite the regionalism that characterizes Bolivia’s indigenous 
movements overall, we see indigenous populations nationwide supporting significant 
protest events, though with relatively little mobilizing by the groups in Bolivia’s oil-rich 
east.  This dynamic contrasts sharply with the events that have taken place in Ecuador, 
where regional actions are the critical factor for the increase in government involvement 
in the oil sector.  That is, despite renowned national unity among Ecuadorian indigenous 
peoples, regionalism pervades in the case of hydrocarbon policy. 
When exploring the current situation of the oil sector in Ecuador it is important to 
consider indigenous mobilization in particular, given its strong political influence in 
Ecuador since the early 1990s.267  These uprisings symbolized a significant turning point 
in the history of Ecuador’s indigenous mobilization.  This chapter will examine 
indigenous demands by analyzing a number of protests surrounding the oil sector. 
The chapter shows how Ecuador’s indigenous organizations have exhibited an 
impressive ability to organize nationally and press salient demands on the Ecuadorian 
government.  It describes how Ecuador’s national indigenous movement was the result of 
the coming together of two significant regional movements from the Andes and the 
Amazon.  Importantly, the chapter also shows that, the national movement has lost 
significant power in recent years.  Mutual agreement on specific issues aided in the initial 
merging of these movements, while other topics of contention continued to plague 
regional and even local movements.  The inability of the national movement to address 
specific grievances led regional organizations to take a different approach such as  
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submitting their own demands or protesting separately.  In this context, Amazon 
organizations have used strategies of regional protest to force the state to address their 
grievances.      
While Amazon indigenous groups play a significant role in policy protest, there 
are also other major actors in the region: colonists and oil workers.  A description of 
these actors is appropriate to understand the force that these groups together are able to 
apply on the government.  One important factor facilitating strong, unified mobilization 
for increasing state control of the oil sector is the lack of a strong conservative regional 
movement, in contrast to the case of Bolivia. 
A. REGIONAL-LEVEL PROTEST AGAINST HYDROCARBON POLICIES 
Ecuadorian indigenous groups use protest as a means to voice their grievances on 
a number of issues.  As we see in the history of these groups, in the Andes and the 
Amazon, their capacity to organize and confront the state on a number of issues is 
exceptional.  Like in the Bolivian Andes, unions played a significant role in aiding in the 
development of Ecuadorian indigenous organizations.  Not only did unions present an 
example of coordination and organizing, but they also use protests and strikes as a 
mechanism for confronting the state directly.  Local, regional, and national protests, 
strikes, and other uprisings have become the most preferred way to mobilize and 
approach the Ecuadorian state.   
1. 1990: A Turning Point in Indigenous Mobilization 
The first major indigenous uprising occurred in May and June 1990, when a group 
of highland indigenous peoples occupied the Santo Domingo Cathedral in Quito and went 
on a ten-day hunger strike.268  This uprising signaled the public christening of Ecuador’s 
national indigenous movement, as it was the first organized effort by the national 
organization CONAIE.269 
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What began in Quito as a hunger strike quickly spread throughout Ecuador and 
included Amazonian provinces.  A large number of indigenous communities participated, 
regarding the mobilization as a chance to voice their grievances and demands.  Yashar 
highlights a point that is important for the present analysis, as it demonstrates the 
importance of local decision making practices: “the 1990 uprising exhibited the 
importance of local decision making bodies, since it was these actors that made the 
decision to participate in the event.”270  The uprising immobilized Andean cities for one 
week with coordinated roadblocks, market boycotts, the occupation of government 
buildings, and land invasions.271  CONAIE used this opportunity to present their 16-point 
platform, which identified demands pertaining to education and cultural rights, land, and 
improvements in rural development and the cost of living.272  The points that are the 
most significant to this analysis include the demands concerning land titles through which 
the groups plan to regain territory lost to oil exploration or to protect land from future oil 
exploration.   
The protests ended when then President Borja agreed to meet with CONAIE 
leadership to discuss indigenous demands.  During these discussions, the indigenous 
leaders presented a separate set of demands from the Organización de Pueblos Indígenas 
de Pastaza (OPIP), an Amazonian organization.  At this point negotiations stalled because 
of OPIP demands, which included an appeal for self-rule, political autonomy, and the 
right for Amazonian communities to participate in decisions concerning oil.273  President 
Borja was open to demands concerning economic issues but refused to negotiate on 
questions concerning political rights, especially self-rule and autonomy.274  Although 
negotiations stalled, this first significant nationwide uprising convinced Ecuadorians, 
specifically indigenous communities, that protest was a legitimate medium to express 
grievances and demands.  
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2. OPIP Protests for Communal Lands 
In 1992, OPIP staged a march from Puyo, in Pastaza department, to the capital 
city of Quito to address territorial demands.  OPIP leaders put forth a proposal called the 
Acuerdo Territorial, which defined indigenous territories within the province of Pastaza: 
“They demanded the legalization and autonomous control of ancestral territory (not land) 
and that this territory be granted to indigenous nationalities (not ethnicities).”275  As in 
1990, these demands again concerned the state and provoked the interest of conservative 
political figures and the military, which initiated two government reports.276  The report 
by the Ministry of Defense claimed that indigenous groups, OPIP specifically, were 
associated with guerilla groups and therefore were determined to set up their own 
indigenous states.277  Despite such concerns, Borja transferred 1,115,475 hectares of land 
to the Shiwiar, Quichua, Achuar, and Záparo communities.278  Indigenous communities 
eventually benefited from mobilizing, with the titling of 600,000 hectares of Amazon 
land for the Huaorani and 1,115,475 hectares of land for the Quichua of Pastaza 
following a march in April 1992.279  However, these land grants were restricted to 
surface rights; existing land grants to settlers and the state’s subsoil rights remained 
intact.280   
Though it aided Pastaza communities in gaining land rights, the 1992 march had 
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little over half of the land that OPIP had demanded as ancestral lands and further divided 
the land into 19 blocks, assigning each block a land title.281  Sawyer argues the 
following: 
• These new juridical segments bore no resemblance to how indígenas 
themselves delineated their territory or perceived divisions within it.   
• The titled land blocks did not correspond to divisions within indigenous 
authority structures, or to their land-use patterns, or to their understandings 
of their identity as nationalities.282 
These actions taken by the state illustrate a tactic of dealing with indigenous 
communities using the “divide and conquer” approach.  Indigenous leaders complained 
that these blocks misrepresented their communities and illustrated the intentions of the 
state to divide the groups, undermine their solidarity, and erode their cultural practices.283  
Breaking up these territories did indeed undermine the cohesion of these communities. 
3. OPIP Protests, Again 
In January 1994, OPIP members coordinated a protest with CONAIE and the 
regional Amazonian indigenous organization, Confederación de Nacionalidades 
Indígenas de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana (CONFENIAE).  They occupied Ecuador’s 
Ministry of Energy and Mines, demanding that the state hear their grievances on oil 
activity within their territories.284  Large groups of indigenous people stationed 
themselves outside of the government building as participants in the protests.   
The catalysts to this event were the changes made to the Hydrocarbons Law and 
the Séptimo Ronda.  The state implemented a new hydrocarbons law in response to 
dismal forecasts on the future of Ecuadorian oil.  The new law provided a legal 
mechanism through which the state could extend attractive investment opportunities to 
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foreign oil companies.285  The Séptimo Ronda was to follow, at which multinational 
corporations would have the chance to bid on the rights to 10 new oil concessions located 
in the Amazon.286  Four of the 10 concessions were in Pastaza in indigenous 
territories.287  After a five-hour standoff, the Minister of Energy and Mines agreed to 
meet with the protestors.  Indigenous leaders presented their demands, which included the 
suspension of oil exploration, mediation by a human rights group, an investigation into 
the activities of oil companies in the Amazon, creation of a system for monitoring 
activity, and a requirement that companies negotiate with OPIP, rather than with 
individual communities.288  These demands illustrate the grievances of OPIP and 
Amazon indigenous communities.  It further illustrates a rejection of the “divide and 
conquer” strategy that the state and oil companies had utilized to sustain unfettered 
access into the Amazon.   
4. Oil Workers Protest Privatization 
The interests of the oil-worker activists in oil sector policy is based on an 
understanding by the workers of what their company represents; the first and most 
prestigious national company with an interest in the  improvement of the lives of 
Ecuadorians.289  As discussed in Chapter I, and paralleling the Bolivian case, Ecuador’s 
economic troubles forced the government to encourage foreign investment in the 
hydrocarbons sector from the 1980s through the 2000s.  Proposed stabilization policies 
enflamed much of the popular sector.  In 1995, petroleum workers chained themselves to 
a homemade pipeline at one of Quito’s busiest gas stations to protest the privatization of 
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the Trans-Ecuadorian Oil Pipeline, SOTE.290  The protest turned into a hunger strike, 
which gained a great amount of media attention and forced the government to abandon 
plans for privatization.291  Petroecuador oil workers responded with strikes to new 
proposals to privatize the sector in June 2003.  Events disrupted exports and cost the state 
millions in lost revenues.292 
Petroleum workers are organized into unions, the two most important being the 
Federation of Ecuadorian Petroleum Workers (FETRAPEC) and the Committee of 
Petroecuador Workers (CETAPE).293  While the initial focus of these unions was labor 
rights, their position evolved into one of “petro-responsibility” to the nation, with the 
view that their struggle is not for workers’ compensation but rather a political struggle 
that will determine the direction of a new state and economy.294  Since its founding in the 
1970s, Ecuadorian society has perceived the state oil company as the first and most 
prestigious national company in Ecuador.  In this context, activist oil-workers cite a 
social responsibility to the Ecuadorian population and because of this, they have been 
very critical of neoliberal restructuring.295  While this sector is not demanding a greater 
share of the resources or compensation, it is committed to pursuing a social purpose 
toward Ecuadorian citizens.296 
5. The Aggressive Techniques of Amazon Colonists 
Besides Amazon indigenous populations and oil-workers, there is still one more 
relevant actor when it comes to oil protest in Ecuador, the Amazon colonists.  The 
impetus to mobilize for the colonists does not rest on a symbolic relationship, like that 
between the oil-worker and Ecuadorians, nor does it rest on demands surrounding 
                                                 




294 Term “petro-responsibility” taken from Valdivia, “Governing Relations Between People and 
Things,” 466. 
295 Valdivia, “Governing Relations Between People and Things,” 466. 
296 Ibid. 
 74
recognition of ancestral territories or customs.  Rather, the colonists’ grievances stem 
from a long held feeling of entitlement, since colonists moved to the region strictly 
hoping to gain from the newly discovered oil, as part of government policies granting 
incentives to those who colonized the Amazon in the 1960s–1970s.297  
In August 2005, the colonist populations of the Sucumbíos and Orellana 
provinces led a bi-provincial strike, which stopped oil production.298  Protestors closed 
streets and airports and invaded pumping stations in an effort to bring the government to 
the table to negotiate for a greater share of the oil revenues.299  The government 
responded by declaring a state of emergency, suspending constitutional rights in the two 
provinces, which only served to inflame and escalate protests.300  The protests halted 
temporarily, to allow for talks with the government but eventually resumed and 
continued.  In February 2006, protesters occupied pumping stations for Ecuador’s two 
main pipelines, disconnecting valves, shutting off power, and taking petroleum works 
hostage.301  In order to stem unrest, which continued into the early months of 2006, the 
government passed legislation in April 2006 to increase the state’s fiscal take on oil 
revenues to 60 percent.302   
These protests were the response of shared grievances among colonists who live 
in the Amazon region.  Ecuadorians had migrated from the coast and the Andean regions 
to the Amazon in hopes of finding a new livelihood.  The discovery of oil brought new 
hopes for some colonizers who wanted to gain from the new industry.303  Some settlers 
thought that moving near extraction sites would encourage local economic development, 
while the anticipation of petroleum job attracted others.304  Valdivia suggests that the 
reality of the oil industry—specifically, the fact that it has not produced the jobs that they 
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had hoped, it did not encourage economic development and people did not get rich from 
settling on land with petroleum reserves—has set in among colonists.  As a result, the 
populations of the oil producing provinces of Sucumbíos and Orellana now focus on the 
unmet expectations of the oil industry, the state, and oil companies.305  These groups are 
not protesting to limit oil activity, like indigenous groups.  Colonists merely want to have 
their expectations met, which would mean increasing their access to oil revenues 
produced in this region. 
B. EXPLAINING REGIONAL MOBILIZATION SURROUNDING 
HYDROCARBONS 
How can we explain the regional character of oil protest in Ecuador that led to 
increased state control over hydrocarbons?  The remainder of this chapter argues that 
Amazon indigenous groups initiate and lead many of the protests mentioned above.  
Similar to the Bolivian case, we see the continued participation of a single regional 
indigenous organization.  However, in Bolivia, Andean organizations, which do not live 
in the natural gas region, protest natural gas policies.  Draconian neoliberal economic 
policies that adversely affected all popular and indigenous sectors, union identities, and 
indigenous appeal enabled Andean organizations to play such a role in Bolivia.  In 
contrast, in Ecuador the overall implementation of neoliberal economic policies was 
limited, though its strongest effects were within the oil sector, affecting mostly 
inhabitants of the Amazon region. In that context, inhabitants of the oil-rich east—and 
not highland indigenous groups—have been the main initiators and leaders of these 
protests. 
Like Bolivia, Ecuadorian indigenous movements emerged in response to regional 
issues.  There are strong regional organizations from the Andes and the Amazon.  For the 
purpose of this thesis, acknowledgement of the main Andean organization, Ecuador 
Runacanapac Riccharimui (ECUARUNARI, established in 1972) is sufficient.  A focused 
description is not required to understand the role of those indigenous movements.  
ECUARUNARI was instrumental in the unification of the regional movements under a 
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national confederation.  As illustrated by the above description of oil protests, the 
national confederation, Amazon indigenous organizations, colonists, and oil workers are 
the most important actors concerning oil policy.   
1. Amazon Indigenous Movements: The Foundations of Highly Effective 
Mobilization 
Historically, the state has been non-existent in Ecuador’s Amazon.  While the 
state made a concerted effort in the 1960s and 1970s to incorporate and strengthen its 
presence in the Andean region, it did not make any similar efforts in the Amazon 
region.306  Andean indigenous communities fought to gain autonomy, while Amazonian 
communities largely maintained their autonomy.  State-building projects, political parties, 
and even census workers avoided the Amazonian region throughout much of Ecuador’s 
history, leaving these communities to develop and maintain their own political systems 
and customs. 307  Boundaries in this region were very fluid and depended on the needs of 
the communities living within them; defined only by use, as Yashar points out: 
Communities were essentially defined by extended families or a group of 
extended families.  They were largely dispersed, autonomous, and 
itinerant—moving not infrequently to take advantage of different 
ecological niches and needs.  Hence, while a family did not have titles or 
exact boundaries to delimit what was theirs, patterns of use defined the 
right to reside there—even if only temporarily.308 
As was the case in the Bolivian Amazon region, a set of laws, most importantly 
those addressing land reform, provided the catalysts that influenced Amazonian 
communities to mobilize and take action, beginning in the 1980s.  The laws that had the 
most significant effect on the Amazon region were the 1964 and 1973 land reform laws, 
the 1977 Law of Colonization of the Amazon Region, and the 1981 Law of Forestry and 
Natural Areas and Wildlife Conservation.   
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While the land reform laws extended a degree of land, social, and civil rights to 
Andean indigenous communities, they did the opposite for Amazonian communities, as 
they encouraged colonization of the Amazon region.  In this context, the state opened up 
the region to anyone willing and able to clear, farm, and graze these areas.309  The state 
did not extend to this region the project aimed at registering communities for granting 
land titles.  As a result, the government did not recognize the territories of the original 
inhabitants. Colonizers, ranging from farmers and ranchers to Andean indigenous groups, 
were able to claim lands that Amazonian communities previously inhabited.  This 
encroachment by colonizers and the state were critical catalysts that politicized 
Amazonian groups.310 
Aside from the colonization issues, the discovery of oil also led outsiders to claim 
Amazonian indigenous territories and trigger indigenous mobilization.  In 1982, the 
government passed hydrocarbons and tax laws to attract foreign investment in the 
region.311 Oil exploration and development became a national imperative when the 
military regime (1972–79) labeled it a national security issue and began to penetrate the 
region in order to secure these areas and ensure the rule of law.312  These events served to 
challenge the autonomy of the indigenous communities that inhabited the areas.  As 
Yashar points out, the movement of international oil interests into the region did not 
include titles to large land areas (like the colonization); it merely focused on oil resources 
and the additional infrastructure needed to support the new industry.313  Despite the fact 
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environmental issues to the region.  The state failed to regulate oil company activities on 
a consistent basis, which resulted in environmental damage, forcing first the animals and 
then some of the people to flee further into the forests.314   
If the above-described events politicized indigenous groups in this region as they 
sought to defend their livelihood and develop state-indigenous relations,315 other factors 
provided indigenous groups the capacity to organize. In response to grievances 
concerning land issues, the state required these groups to register as associations, 
comunas, or cooperatives in order to gain land titles and access to the state in general.316  
The efforts of religious groups to civilize and Christianize individual communities and 
families resulted in the development of networks among communities.317   
Three very important organizations emerged because of the threats posed to 
indigenous livelihood combined with these networking opportunities.  The Federación de 
Centros Shuar was founded in 1964.318  This group in particular is important because it 
provided the framework that subsequent Amazonian organizations emulated.  The Shuar 
utilized effective networking and communication techniques, forming nine centers with 
schools and clinics. Five of these centers would work in agriculture.319  Literacy and 
religious programs on the radio were the preferred method of communication between 
these centers.320  The Shuar were able to gain land titles by actively working their lands 
to gain resources.  Shuar leaders came to be significant actors in both the regional and 
national movements. 
Another significant organization was the Federación de Organizaciones Indígenas 
del Napo (FOIN), originally founded in 1969 (under a different name).  The basis of this 
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organization was to defend their land and fight abuses by authorities.321  Leaders of this 
organization, like the Shuar leaders, gained invaluable language training and techniques 
from missionaries, in order to aid in their dealings with authorities.  In defending their 
land, the FOIN pushed for land titling but took a unique approach: aware of the ability of 
outsiders to pressure or otherwise persuade individuals to sell land rights for goods, the 
organization agreed to communal land titles so that members would be unable to sell land 
without communal consent.322  The organization also sought to ensure that any disputes 
remained within the communities, avoiding possible abuses and fines imposed by the 
state.323   
The third significant organization to emerge in the Amazon region was the 
Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza (OPIP), which formed after the Shuar 
organization and FOIN and was influenced by other indigenous organizations.324  By the 
1970s, the state recognized the economic benefits of the oil industry and foreign 
investment and welcomed increased oil activity.325  The resulting effect was the 
formation of OPIP, which, like other organizations, were threatened by the encroachment 
of outsiders and sought to regain land rights.  OPIP is a strong and significant 
organization in Pastaza, as illustrated in the above protest events.  The communities rely 
on OPIP to deal with the state and advance the development of indigenous communities. 
The three organizations are undoubtedly the most important in the creation of a 
regional organization.  In 1980 the Shuar, FOIN, OPIP and other Amazon organizations 
founded Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana 
(CONFENAIE), to represent Amazon indigenous groups.326  The goal of this regional 
organization was to coordinate among communities and defend land their rights and 
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cultures.327  Additionally, the organization demanded an end to colonization, access to 
social programs, and a percentage of oil and mining revenues. 
It is important to note the demands of CONFENAIE concerning oil.  The 
organization sought increased access to oil revenue as of 1989.  However, OPIP protests 
demanded a moratorium on exploration in 1994 and mediation with human rights 
organizations.  Sharper demands in 1994 were likely in response to the recognition of 
health and environmental dangers stemming from the industry. 
2. Division Within the Strong National Indigenous Movement 
In order to understand why Ecuador’s Amazonian indigenous groups would 
protest hydrocarbon policies as part of a multi-sector regional movement and not as part 
of a national indigenous effort, it is critical to examine divisions within the country’s 
notoriously powerful national indigenous organization.  This section describes the 
formation of Ecuador’s national indigenous organization and subsequently discusses 
divisions within it.   
a. CONAIE: The Formation of a Strong National Indigenous 
Movement 
Despite differences between highland and Amazonian regional interests, 
indigenous organizations were able to combine forces to create a national movement that 
retained the same strength that regional organizations developed.  The goals of each 
organization were similar in that they included a desire to defend their land and their 
rights.  The CONAIE, the national Ecuadorian indigenous organization, was founded in 
1986 by ECUARUNARI and CONFENAIE.  This national organization was the 
legitimate representative of all indigenous peoples in Ecuador, and capable of negotiating 
with the state on issues.328   
The founding of Ecuador’s national indigenous organization was not 
without its challenges.  The first challenge that members of ECUARUNARI and 
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CONFENAIE faced was convincing regional groups that there was a shared identity 
between regions.  At this point, the leadership turned to tactics used to develop regional 
organizations like networking, communicating, and building mutual trust between 
communities.  The second and very significant challenge that the leadership faced in 
developing the national organization was the core principles and demands.  They needed 
to ensure the ability of the national confederation to express the demands of each region.  
While land was a central issue to both of these groups, their regional understanding of the 
importance of land differed sharply.  ECUARUNARI was influenced by a class-based 
opinion of land as a productive resource.  In contrast, the CONFENAIE believed that 
land was paramount to its survival.   
The views of ECUARUNARI would change with the transition to 
democracy, neoliberal policies, and the economic crisis.  Neoliberal policies and 
stabilization measures forced the government to cut back on subsidies, agricultural 
inputs, and public expenditures.329  These changes negatively affected the Andean 
communities’ livelihood and served to shift their view of land as the fore-mentioned 
events imposed a new threat to their autonomy and survival.  These events aligned the 
goals and demands of CONFENAIE and ECUARUNARI.  Land rights united CONAIE 
and remain a core demand of the organization.   
The successes of CONAIE in the early 1990s led some members to want 
to participate formally in politics.  At CONAIE’s 1993 congress, the confederation made 
the decision to participate in local and municipal elections.330  Amazonian leaders voiced 
a desire to enter electoral politics and wanted to do so at the national level by joining the 
Movimiento Pachakutik.331  The idea gained widespread support in the Amazon and 
forced CONAIE to reconsider its stand on national elections and join the coalition 
movement Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik Nuevo País (MUPP).332  The 
coalition movement became the political wing of CONAIE and of the Social Movement 
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Coordinator (CMS), which is an umbrella organization for non-indigenous social 
movements and unions.333  In 1996 the party won eight congressional seats and elected 
over seventy candidates to local and municipal positions.334  The elections together with 
the successful protests were undoubtedly a high point in CONAIE’s history.  The 
movement began to participate regularly in politics. 
b. Divisions Within CONAIE 
Despite CONAIE’S political successes, the confederation began to 
experience difficulties in cohesion following the 2002 election of President Lucio 
Gutiérrez.  In the run-up to that election, CONAIE and Pachakutik formed an alliance 
with Gutiérrez’ Patriotic Society Party (PSP).335  Though Gutiérrez’ campaign was in 
line with CONAIE and Pachakutik views, after the election he started to support austerity 
measures which signified a change in direction.336  Gutiérrez forced Pachakutik cabinet 
members to go along with some measures, though the members limited what they 
could.337  Indigenous organizations perceived these actions as a betrayal, and many 
indigenous organizations, including CONAIE, called for a change in the cabinet’s 
economic ministers.338 
The alliance between Pachakutik and the PSP crumbled when Pachakutik 
members began to refuse to support legislation.339  Following the breakdown of the 
alliance, internal divisions became clear as the Amazon groups criticized leaders for 
leaving the government, and Andean groups criticized leaders for staying too long.340  
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Gutiérrez further complicated matters when he rescinded the ability of the confederation 
to appoint personnel in charge of indigenous affairs.341  By the end of Gutiérrez’ first 
year in office, CONAIE was calling for a protest to demand his dismissal, which the 
Amazon groups opposed and other groups ignored.342  In 2004, CONAIE tried to 
organize two protests, which were called off as Amazonian and other indigenous 
organizations refused to participate.   
In sum, though the 1990s exhibited a cohesive national indigenous 
confederation, the 2000s showed a split within the movement.  Importantly, throughout 
the history of the national confederation, the Amazon indigenous groups have 
consistently displayed their independence from the national confederation.  As was 
exhibited in CONAIE-led protests, the Amazon groups have always had their own set of 
demands.  During the mid-1990s, it was the Amazon groups’ desire to participate in 
national elections that forced CONAIE to change its decision on the matter.  The 
Gutiérrez presidency merely served to divide the confederation further.     
C. OIL PROTEST REMAINS REGIONAL 
This chapter examined the actors and their demands concerning the oil industry 
and oil policy in Ecuador.  The significant actors in protests against oil policy have 
included the state, oil workers, colonists, and Amazon indigenous groups.  Though 
regional and national movements do exist, it has been local organizations that 
consistently address grievances and demands in the case of oil issues.  The 1990 protest 
illustrates this fact when CONAIE leadership handed the President OPIP’s separate 
demands.  The 1992 and 1994 mobilizations ended with OPIP again presenting a list of 
specific demands.  The solidarity of the indigenous movement is useful when examining 
oil policy in Ecuador, since it exhibits the relative strength in the regional movements as 
compared to the national confederation.  Regional struggles were enough to force the 
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government to increase its involvement in the sector by increasing the government’s take 
and announcing the renegotiation of contracts if necessary.343 
As we have seen, protests around the oil sector in Ecuador differ significantly 
from those in Bolivia.  The most effective protests in Ecuador are located in the oil-rich 
Amazon region, and protestors use aggressive techniques to bring the government to the 
negotiating table.  In contrast, major oil protests in Bolivia were located in Andean cities 
and led by Andean indigenous groups who have no direct experience with hydrocarbon 
activities and do not live in the natural gas-rich region of the country.   
Another important contrast between the two countries pertains to the organization 
of regional conservative actors.  Elite-led civic committee movements are a significant 
force that neutralizes indigenous activity in eastern Bolivia.  Similar groups are not 
present in Amazonian Ecuador.  On the contrary, while the catalyst to mobilize is not the 
same for all protestors in Ecuador’s Amazon, all groups pursue the basic goal of 
achieving more state control in the oil sector, be that control increased revenues, limiting 
oil activities, or more state oversight.  Protestors in the Ecuadorian Amazon therefore do 
not neutralize one another, as they do in Bolivia.  In fact, these movements together 
enable the application of constant pressure on the government to change policies.344   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
When looking at the hydrocarbons sectors in Bolivia and Ecuador and 
mobilization around policies, there are many similarities and many significant 
differences.  In examining across-time variations within each country, one finds that 
private involvement in the sector in both countries has been a continuous requirement for 
each country.  This is important when looking at the mobilizations: while strong and 
forceful, they have had to concede the presence of these companies no matter how 
strongly movements demand their expropriation.  This is evidence that when it comes to 
the natural resource sectors in both countries, demands for increased state oversight and 
control are more likely to succeed as opposed to demands to stop or limit production. 
When looking at the protests demanding increased state involvement, there is 
marked variation across countries and across time that has to do with the ability of the 
protestors to evolve into or work within a national movement.  The cross-country 
variation highlights the fact that protestors in Bolivia benefited from a national support 
base while protestors in Ecuador benefited from more focused regional actions.  In 
Bolivia national mobilization is explained by the chain of events and protests that 
proceeded the gas wars, including the draconian neo-liberal reforms which effected a 
large sector of society, and the water wars which included many of the same types, if not 
the very same, actors as the gas wars.  The techniques of MAS and Evo Morales also 
influenced this national outpouring of support; the party seeks to include not just 
indigenous groups but a large coalition from the popular sector.  When looking at 
Ecuador’s movements, from the outset it was obvious that Amazon organizations would 
retain a certain amount of independence.  For instance, they demonstrate their 
independence by submitting demands to the government separate from the demands 
proposed by the national movement; seeking participation in national elections when 
CONAIE had decided at its 1993 congress to participate locally; and refusing to 
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participate in CONAIE-organized protests in 2004.345  Scholars have attributed this 
behavior to regional cleavages that persist despite the formation of CONAIE.346  
When looking at the variation between countries concerning mobilization in the 
hydrocarbons rich regions of Bolivia and Ecuador, there is a decided difference in the 
strength of indigenous movements.  In Bolivia, like in Ecuador, the indigenous groups in 
the eastern region are very small and widely dispersed.  In Bolivia, however, the 
hydrocarbons sector is located mostly in the Chaco region and thus has no effect on those 
groups living in the Amazon region.  So not only are the populations small in general, but 
they get even smaller when the eastern region is split between the Amazon and the 
Chaco.  Another factor affecting mobilization in the hydrocarbons-rich region of Bolivia 
is the presence of strong conservative civic committees lead by business interests who 
support foreign investment in the hydrocarbons sector.  The interests and strength of 
these groups encourage the support of eastern indigenous tribes by appealing to their 
demands for land.  In contrast, in Ecuador, the populations in the Amazon are all affected 
by the presence of oil, which has been there for a much longer period of time relative to 
the Bolivian case.  Ecuadorian populations have therefore felt the direct effects of the 
industry on their livelihoods over a significant amount of time.  Though there are 
differences in opinion among these groups on the activities of oil, they have all figured 
out how to make their demands heard: using aggressive protest techniques that cut off 
production and force negotiations.347   
A. THE EFFECTS OF INCREASED STATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY 
This thesis explained the events and issues leading up to the recent increase in 
state involvement in the natural gas sector in Bolivia and the oil sector in Ecuador.  The 
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following is a discussion of the implications of these policy changes that have 
materialized thus far.  While there is a limited amount of scholarly material available on 
the effects of hydrocarbon policy reforms, reports suggest that actions taken by both 
governments to increase state control of the sector has the potential for triggering 
renewed unrest which could in turn cause decreased private investment in Bolivia and 
Ecuador. 
In Bolivia, the potential for renewed unrest under the Morales government is 
likely due to the inability of the natural gas industry to benefit the popular sector, which 
is what these populations had demanded in their push for nationalization.  As Kohl and 
Farthing point out, nationalized or not, the hydrocarbons industry will not be immediately 
beneficial.348  Morales gained the support of the underprivileged population, to include 
indigenous groups, during his rise to the presidency.  The belief among these groups is 
that the hydrocarbons industry can create jobs, improve infrastructure, direct revenue 
toward social programs, and redistribute wealth.  However, the reality is that the industry 
provides little opportunity to skilled workers and even less opportunity to unskilled 
workers.  While Morales has been able to direct some of the increased revenues toward 
social programs for children, pregnant woman, and the elderly, only 35 percent of 
revenues will actually go to new investments, like these social programs.349  Kohl and 
Farthing further point out that to extract natural gas resources effectively, a large amount 
of investment is necessary to improve or develop infrastructure, and this infrastructure 
often does not benefit society in the way that many Bolivians believe it will.350  Finally, 
Kohl and Farthing argue that social benefits may keep Bolivians satisfied in the short 
term, but current and future Bolivian governments will need to undertake major 
economic reforms in order for them to make the desired benefits a reality.351  
Disappointment due to the lack of social benefits and employment opportunities 
resonates mostly with Morales supporters; during his campaign, Morales signaled that 
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nationalizing the natural gas industry and increasing the government’s take would benefit 
the popular sector.  Furthermore, reports indicate that foreign investment has decreased 
and that neighboring countries are now seeking sources of natural gas that are more 
reliable, adding to the uncertainty caused by the nationalization.352 
On the other side of this discussion on unrest are non-indigenous movements from 
the natural gas-producing department of Tarija, whose inhabitants demand that they 
receive a significant share of the increased revenues and align themselves with the Santa 
Cruz autonomy movements described above.353  These movements have placed an 
emphasis on protecting their entitlements in terms of natural gas revenues.354  Further 
research on these issues will reveal the position of President Morales in terms of how he 
will deal with these conflicting interests.  As President, he is beholden to his constituency 
but at the same time must maintain political stability.  Movements in Tarija only 
strengthen the demands for autonomy, but President Morales can potentially ally with 
these movements if he is able to yield to their demands. 
In Ecuador, like in Bolivia, the implications of increasing state control over oil 
include renewed social unrest and a reported decrease in foreign investment.  The 
Ecuadorian government announced its plan to renegotiate oil contracts with private 
companies in 2007.355  Private companies have rejected these demands and have 
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decreased investment and activity to reduce their risk.356  One report suggests that the 
reduced investment has brought down oil production by 4.9 percent.357   
President Correa also faces increasing unrest from social forces that demand the 
protection of parts of the Amazon where oil exists but has not been exploited.  President 
Correa himself initially supported this project, with his initiative to “leave almost 1 
billion barrels of oil in the Ishpingo Tambacocha Tipituni oilfield unexploited, in return 
for international compensation totaling half of the projected revenues.”358  On its 
website, the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) suggested that 
progress on this project has been slow due to Correa’s unwillingness to negotiate with the 
countries who are supposed to pay to keep the oil in the ground.359  The NACLA website 
further noted that the Shuar Amazon indigenous organization claimed it would defend its 
territory if the state attempted to exploit resources on their land.360   
It may be too early to assess the effects of increasing state control of the industry 
in Bolivia or Ecuador, but this initial analysis of contemporary politics surrounding the 
hydrocarbon industry in the two countries suggests decreased private investment. 
Furthermore, government policies to spend oil and gas revenue have left many social 
sectors dissatisfied. These factors combined could in the future lead to a reversal of 
policies aimed at increasing the state’s role in the industries.   
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B. BUY-OFFS: THE INTRICACIES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE 
COMPANIES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN HYDROCARBON 
REGIONS 
Although this thesis has focused on opposition to hydrocarbon companies and the 
organizing capacity of communities in hydrocarbon regions, in fact, relations between 
companies and communities are more complex.  I will now discuss how in some cases, 
oil companies have bought off indigenous communities, interrupting the potential for 
communities to come together and mobilize cohesively against the companies and the 
government. 
As a first example, a Huaorani organization, the Organización de las 
Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana (ONHAE), actually welcomes oil 
company investment for the improvement of their livelihood.  This Ecuadorian 
Amazonian group benefits from multinational oil companies, thereby eroding indigenous 
solidarity in the region.  A brief analysis of the ONHAE case shows that it initially 
formed independent of oil companies, and was quickly coopted. 
Four factors lead to the creation of ONHAE, which was founded in March 1990. 
First, a core group of young ambitious, educated men wanted to improve the living 
conditions in their communities and felt that they could act as mediators between the 
community and the state.361  The second factor was the decreasing presence of the 
missionaries of the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), who had acted as mediators 
between the Huaorani, the state and other outsiders.  The missionaries had, on an ongoing 
basis, denounced indigenous organizing and further forbade the Huaorani peoples from 
engaging with these organizations.362  The third factor was the growing influence of 
outsiders, to include CONAIE, CONFENIAE and OPIP, who encouraged the community 
to organize.  The final and most important factor behind the founding of ONHAE was the 
increasing oil activity in their territory by multinational oil companies.     
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In 1992, ONHAE staged a march that would mark a turning point in the history of 
the organization and draw it into negotiations with multinational oil companies.  ONHAE 
marched to Quito and camped on the street outside of Maxus and Petroecuador for a 
week until then President Sixto Duran Ballen agreed to meet with the organization.  
According to Ziegler-Otero, ONHAE leadership attempted to voice its grievances but 
ended up signing the first pact between ONHAE and the private oil company Maxus, 
which operated in the same zone where ONHAE members lived.363 
The negotiations granted Maxus permission to build roads in Huaorani territory in 
exchange for the construction of a school building and medicine.364  Although the pact 
was controversial within ONHAE, even after the organization held elections to replace 
the ONHAE leadership that had signed the first pact, the newly elected president signed a 
second pact with the company.  This new pact called on the oil company to participate in 
community development by training medical workers and teachers, providing 
vaccinations, transporting the teachers to the communities, and limiting the access of 
outsiders to the Maxus roads.365  Because of these and other agreements, different oil 
companies have been able to establish a personal relationship with ONHAE, even paying 
for the organization’s office and paying some salaries to ONHAE workers.366  ONHAE 
receives benefits for its members from the agreements with the oil companies. However, 
those agreements have served to undermine other indigenous organizations: “The 
leadership of OPIP has been very frustrated by these separate Huaorani agreements, 
which it sees as weakening its own position in dealing with not only Maxus, but with all 
of the oil companies in the region.”367 
Another case involves neighboring Amazon indigenous communities, the Cofán 
and the Secoya, who engage in what Valdivia calls “authentic” and “inauthentic” 
indigeneity.  The Cofán community has engaged in authentic indigeneity, in that the 
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community has collectively opposed oil operations in their territory by destroying oil 
infrastructure and expelling oil technicians from their territory who were there 
illegally.368  This behavior contrasts with that of the neighboring community of the 
Secoya, which has engaged in inauthentic indigeneity by owning cattle and negotiating 
with oil companies.369  Secoya activity resulted in the loss of support from 
environmentalist groups who felt that the Secoya were “weakening a pan-indigenous 
position against oil development.”370   
These cases are just a few examples of the complexity of the relationship between 
indigenous organizations or communities, the state, and oil companies.  Further research 
on the divisiveness of this activity could address the impact on indigenous organizing, the 
oil industry, and political stability.  Nonetheless, closing this thesis with a discussion of 
varied company-community relations in oil regions is paramount, as it cautions us not to 
assume consistency or continuity in the political positions of different social sectors with 
regard to the development of hydrocarbons or, particularly relevant to this analysis, for 
the public-private balance in the sector. 
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